[EM] "More Condorcet myths"

[Michael Ossipoff]

(For clarification, I’m going to say “I reply now” before my replies made in 
this posting, to distinguish them from replies someone has quoted from 
earlier postings).

Warren says:

It [Participation failure]  shows voting honestly can hurt you (versus not 
voting at all)
in every Condorcet system.

I reply now:

So pity the poor Condorcet voter who is strategically forced to stay home on 
election day. <smiley>

When a method offers as much as Condorcet does, there is sure to be some 
kind of tradeoff. Something that someone lacking in honesty can seize upon 
and try to portray as a major problem. Sorry, but I don’t consider 
Participation failure a serious problem. It isn’t a strategy dilemma. It 
doesn’t prevent voters to dilute or abandon their genuine preferences. It 
doesn’t force them to let their favorite lose to a compromise, as RV will 
do.

--WDS:
There seems to be the idea in either Ritchie's or other minds
that, if you allow equalities in rankings in a Condorcet voting systems
(and/or, handle them via "winning votes")
then "order reversal" will not be required of a strategic voter.

I reply now:

Falsification of preference is the only offensive strategy that can cause a 
problem for wv Condorcet. I refer you to SFC and GSFC. With SFC- complying 
methods, if you’re part of a majority who prefer the CW to someone else 
(without necessarily knowing that s/he is the CW), and if you and your 
majority vote sincerely, then that less-liked candidate can’t win.

(I’ve plausibly defined sincere voting for the purpose of my criteria, and 
posted that definition here and at the barnsdle website.

My criteria can be found at:

http://www.barnsdle.demon.co.uk/vote/sing.html

In other words, you and your majority are strategically free to rank 
sincerely, under that criterion’s plausible premise conditions.
That’s why it’s called the Strategy-Free Criterion. That’s why I say call it 
the pinnacle of the promise of rank-balloting.

Warren continues:

I believe that idea is false.  I suspect that in every Condorcet system, 
whether
rank-equalities are allowed or not, and whether "winning-votes" are used or 
not,
there are election situations where you (a voter or co-feeling small bloc
of voters) must cast a vote which
is fully-dishonest about one or more orderings, i.e in which you say A>B
when you honestly feel B>A.  If you do not do this in your vote,
then you get a worse election winner.

I reply now:

I have a big surprise for Warren: I’ve been pointing out for a long time 
that Condorcet wv doesn’t strictly meet FBC. No one claims that it does.
But wv’s FBC failure is unlikely, and is unlikely to cause a strategy fear 
that will intimidate most voters.

Some time ago I was recommending Kevin’s method that meets FBC, SFC, & SDSC, 
because, as I said then, that method has something for everyone--even for 
the timid voter who insists on FBC compliance in order to not vote 
Compromise over Favorite. I spoke to someone who wanted to vote all the 
Democrats over Nader in an Internet BeatpathWinner poll, without believing 
that the Democrats’ honesty or policies were as good as Nader’s. And I 
couldn’t assure her that there could never be a benefit in doing that, 
because Condorcet doesn’t meet FBC. That was what attracted me to the method 
that meets FBC, SFC & SDSC.

Since then I feel that the guarantees of SFC, GSFC and SDSC will be 
sufficient to reassure most people that they needn’t defensively 
order-reverse. If someone is interested in strategy enough to consider 
defensive order-reversal, then s/he can be expected to look at the 
guarantees of SFC, GSFC and SDSC. If s/he is in a majority such as the one 
specified in those criteria, then s/he has nothing to worry about and 
needn’t consider defensive order-reversal.

And if you aren’t in such a majority, then what can you really expect 
anyway? So I prefer SSD’s added advantage of GSFC compliance to that other 
method’s added advantage of FBC compliance.

But I emphasize that if Warren wants FBC, then he needn’t look farther than 
the method that meets FBC, SFC and SDSC. He needn’t settle for the little 
that RV offers.

Warren continues:

One way to set up such a situation (which should work against most of
the Condorcet systems discussed on EM) is this.
You honestly feel A>C>the other candidates.
If you do nothing or vote honestly, then C will be the Condorcet winner.
If you vote A>the others>C  then C will no longer be
the Condorcet winner allowing A to win.
If you rank the others EQUAL to C then C will still be the Condorcet winner.

I reply now:

Warren has discovered offensive order-reversal. We’ve talked at length on EM 
about why it isn’t a problem for wv Condorcet. I hope it isn’t necessary to 
repeat all of that here for Warren. I’ve said it in recent posts, during the 
past few days, or at least during the past week. I shouldn’t have to repeat 
it again now.


>Ossipoff: ...elections in which equal ranking is disallowed. Of course
no one is proposing such a version of Condorcet.
--WDS: Tideman in his 2006 book recommends exactly that.
Just because the most recent and important book in an area recommends 
something, does
that mean  that Ossipoff should retreat one iota from his stance that "no 
one" does?

I reply now:

I meant that no serious voting system reform advocate advocates such a 
method. I’ve often said here that all or nearly all voting system academics 
have their heads up their ass.

Warren quotes past discussion:

>WDS: In IEVS, presently, equal rankings are forbidden in rank-order
>methods.
>M.Ossipoff: which (like Warren's other assumptions) makes the results
meaningless.
>WDS: I do not agree I ever made any "assumption" here.
>M.O.: If you didn't assume or believe the premises you based your 
>simulation
on, then even you must not have believed that your simulation's results
would have any relevance to real-world elections. Shall we call them
simulation-premises instead of assumptions then, to avoid any
speculation  about what you were thinking? ...if your simulation
is based on counterfactual premises, then its results won't mean anything.

--WDS: I did not make this "assumption."

I reply now:

Perhaps Warren didn’t notice that I’ve quit saying that he made that 
assumption. I now say merely that it’s a premise of his simulation.


Warren continues:

I did not "base my simulation
on" it.  I did not make these "premises."  I did not make these
"simulation-premises."

I reply now:

I’m sorry, Warren, but you did, according to what you told us on EM, about 
your simulation and what went into it. As I said, “Garbage in, garbage out.”


Warren continues:

It would indeed be good if you avoided
speculation about what I think.

I reply now:

Yes, and I’ve quit expressing speculation about what you think about the 
real-world-relevance of your simulation premises.

But, according to what you yourself said, your simulation used those 
premises.

Mike Ossipoff