[EM] Abd reply

[Michael Ossipoff]

Scott Richie:

So, wait, was half the Condorcet electorate strategic voting by doing >order 
reversal? Are we making the assumption that strategic voting is >exactly as 
common in range and Condorcet in these simulations?

Abd:

That would seem to be an unjustified assumption, of course. However, the 
*only* way to vote strategically in Condorcet is to reverse order.

I reply:

No, not really. There’s strategic truncation, and there’s strategic 
equal-ranking.

But I agree that the only conceivable way to have a strategy _problem_ in wv 
Condorcet would be if people are doing offensive order-reversal strategy.

Scott Richie:

. >That seems a bit strong, exactly because the risks are different and the 
 >information required is greater for Condorcet.

Abd:

One thing that Warren's work seems to have done is to answer the common 
objection to Range that sincere voters will be harmed by strategic voters.

I reply:

No, he hasn’t shown that to not be so. It’s obvious that it will be so.

Abd:

That doesn't appear to be true, with a necessary qualification. "Harmed" 
must mean "Significantly harmed." Further, as I've noted, the meaning of 
"strategic voting" is different under Range. It could only refer to 
"magnification." Which isn't order reversal, it's quite a different animal, 
and, it can easily be argued that it is *not* insincere.

I reply:

Abd is playing word-games. Define “sincere” how you want to, but RV will 
make people afraid to fully vote Favorite over Compromise, because that 
would prevent them from fully voting Compromise over Worst. Which part of 
that do some people not understand?

In Condorcet wv, you can fully vote both of those pair-wise preferences, and 
they’ll both be fully counted.

Mike Ossipoff