[Election-Methods] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 42, Issue 80

Juho juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk
Mon Dec 31 07:49:04 PST 2007

On Dec 31, 2007, at 16:38 , CLAY SHENTRUP wrote:

> the point is that with range voting, that voter will have a better
> expected happiness than with other methods - especially if the other
> voters are strategic!  which is precisely the opposite point to what
> it seems that you perceived me to imply.

Could you give an example where strategic voting of voters with  
competing opinions increases one's happiness?

>> Yes, in many situations Range would indeed provide good results. The
>> problem is that in competitive situations it may not do so.
> no!  warren's utility figures tested the full range of 0% strategic
> voters to 100% strategic voters, and found that range voting was
> superior to the other common methods.  in fact, range voting's
> superiority over rivals such as condorcet and borda actually
> _increases_ the more "competitive" the election becomes.
> http://rangevoting.org/StratHonMix.html
> how is this not more well-known in a discussion list of this sort?

I already addressed this in my previous mail. In some of the Warren's  
simulations it appears that the problematic cases from Range are  
hidden because even distribution of strategic voters is assumed.  
Range typically has problems in cases where one party is more  
strategic than the other parties.

>> Different elections have also different needs
>> => maximizing the average utility is not always what we want.
> name an example.  that sounds preposterous.  utility is _by
> definition_ the measure of what voters want.

One example from the Range world: When five friends go out to eat  
pizza result 50,50,50,50,50 may be considered better than result  

>> Do you say that in Condorcet elections the best strategy for A
>> supporters would be to vote A>X>Y>Z>B if they believe that A is the
>> strongest candidate and B is the second strongest candidate?
> yes!  it may be a little more nuanced than that, but that's the gist.
> warren can explain it better i'm sure.

I'm reasonably sure he can't explain that to be a general rule ;-).

> and whether it's a good idea or not, a lot of people will just
> intuitively do it, because it "feels" like they are pushing B down
> more strongly.

That may be the first reaction of some people. I think these  
questions should be discussed before the first election to provide  
sufficient understanding of the method to all voters.

>> I just picked two strategies that have been often recommended and
>> that are simple.
> what you described for condorcet was not a "strategy" -- it was a  
> sincerity! :D

That's the good part in Condorcet. Sincerity is actually a pretty  
good strategy, maybe the best in most situations.


Try the all-new Yahoo! Mail. "The New Version is radically easier to use" – The Wall Street Journal 

More information about the Election-Methods mailing list