[Election-Methods] RE : Re: Re: rcv ala tournament

[Kevin Venzke]

Dan,

--- Dan Bishop <danbishop04 at gmail.com> a écrit :
> >> * Margins makes more intuitive sense than Winning Votes.  The latter
> is 
> >> equivalent to assuming that the people who didn't vote a preference 
> >> between two candidates would have unanimously voted for the pairwise 
> >> loser.  The former is equivalent to assuming that they'd split their 
> >> vote equally between the two, which is MUCH more likely.
> >
> > Can you explain how WV is "equivalent to assuming that the people who
> > didn't vote a preference between two candidates would have unanimously
> > voted for the pairwise loser"? Do you mean "...winner"?
> >   
> No, I mean loser.  Under WV, the following are equivalent:
> 
> A>B: 51
> A=B: 49
> 
> A>B: 51
> B>A: 49

But these are not equivalent:
A>B: 40
A=B: 25
B>A: 35

A>B: 40
B>A: 60

> > To my mind, the theory behind WV is that a contest is more decisive the
> > more people that participate in it. Only you mustn't count the voters
> on
> > the losing side, because they could then regret expressing their
> opinion
> > rather than indifference.
> 
> This is where we disagree.  In my view, a unanimous contest with 30% 
> turnout is more decisive than a 51%-49% contest with 60% turnout, 
> despite the fact that the latter had more votes for the winner.

I think people will see that more people vote among the more visible and
viable candidates, and then expect that the contests among these candidates
should be more important to the outcome, than some contest that is only of
interest within the left or the right wings.

> >> But I see no justification for automatically assuming that "ranked" 
> >> means "approved".
> >
> > How is there less justification to interpret an explicit marking for a
> > candidate as a type of "approval," than to interpret the unspecified
> > preferences as explicit indifference, and using this implied explicit
> > indifference to elect candidates?
> 
> Because it's plausible that voters would rank a candidate they dislike 
> over a candidate they dislike even more. 

It is plausible, but I don't see what you get out of making the assumption.

> The B>C voters might really 
> prefer B>>C>A (for example, B (100) > C (25) > A (0)).  But clearly, 
> they should cast a B>C vote to keep A from getting elected.

If A is a weak candidate and C is a strong one, I don't think that advice
is complete. I think I'll look into it.

Kevin Venzke


      _____________________________________________________________________________ 
Ne gardez plus qu'une seule adresse mail ! Copiez vos mails vers Yahoo! Mail http://mail.yahoo.fr