[Election-Methods] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 42, Issue 69

rob brown rob at karmatics.com
Sun Dec 30 01:10:28 PST 2007

On Dec 29, 2007 7:30 PM, CLAY SHENTRUP <clay at electopia.org> wrote:

> On Dec 29, 2007 5:23 PM,  <election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com>
> wrote:
> good. we want it to be hard for people to vote strategically, and we
> know that it is easy to use strategies like burial with ranked methods
> -- what a great point rob!

Burial with ranked methods (condorcet ones) accomplishes very little,
usually nothing.  That is the whole point of condorcet, is to make strategic
voting accomplish little.

Voting approval style in range gives a very strong advantage.

Anyway, if everyone votes strategically in Range (or Approval), and does so
with perfect strategy and perfect knowledge of the votes of others, it
converges to DSV/Condorcet....since that is exactly what DSV is:  let a
software agent vote cast the "best" range/approval ballot.

the simplicity of AV is in the administration, which is where
> simplicity is good, because we want to keep costs down, and reduce the
> rate of fraud, etc.

I'm aware that Approval is simpler to count and administer than ranked (or

My complaint is that Approval requires the voters to do something that
software can do better....know how others will vote and then cast the best
ballot based on that knowledge.

Approval will have the same sort of cycles condorcet/dsv has, they just
happen in a more difficult to control place....in the minds of voters and in
the polls and the media....rather than just keeping them in the tabulation

> Message: 2
> > From: "rob brown" <rob at karmatics.com>
> > Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] would range/approval have changed
> > I was comparing an election of Bush Gore under approval/range to one
> with
> > Bush/Gore/Nader, demonstrating that adding Nader to the race would have
> hurt
> > Gore.
> > Was that really so confusing?
> what you said isn't confusing, it's just incorrect.

What is incorrect?  I was comparing a hypothetical race A which is Gore vs.
Bush,  to hypothetical race B which is Gore vs Bush vs. Nader.  It was
obviously hypothetical because in the scenario I was discussing, the
election used Range voting.

You are suggesting my use of the phrase "if Nader is in the election"  to
refer to race B is "incorrect"?


This kind of thing is why I tire of discussing things with you.  You do this
over and over and it is tiresome.

 for the record:
> > Nader would have thrown things to Bush in 2000 with Range just as he did
> > under plurality.  Or with Approval, for that matter.
> do you stand by this claim, or do you admit that you were mistaken?

Stand by it.

If it is a Range election, and many people prefer Nader to Gore, it is
inevitable a great many of those will lower Gore's rating in race B compared
to their rating in race A, to account for their preference for Nader.

You acknowledged (in a private email) that even "sincere" range voters are
expected to give their favorite candidate a 100 and least favorite a zero.
So if someone is added to the ballot that you like more than your previous
favorite....what is going to happen to the rating for the your former
favorite?  It will go down.  That is vote splitting.  This is not rocket

Again, as with private email discussion, I have tired of this.  Don't take
my lack of response to mean I agree with you.  More likely it means I
reached my limit of nonsense and stopped reading.
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