[Election-Methods] RE : Re: RE : Re: RE : Re: Simple two candidate election

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Tue Dec 25 06:47:49 PST 2007


--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <abd at lomaxdesign.com> a écrit :
> At 11:18 PM 12/23/2007, rob brown wrote:
> >On Dec 23, 2007 7:28 PM, Kevin Venzke 
> ><<mailto:stepjak at yahoo.fr>stepjak at yahoo.fr> wrote:
> >For Range to work as well as hoped, it is important that voters do *not*
> >realize how to vote effectively. Or, that they choose not to.
> >
> >
> >You've summed up, in 25 words or less, everything that is wrong about
> Range.
> >
> >Very nice job. :)
> Would have been, if it were correct. Range, voted with full strategic 
> effect, reduces to Approval Voting, which may reduce to bullet 
> voting. It *still* is not Plurality, because it only takes a few 
> percent of voters adding multiple votes to eliminate the spoiler effect.

So you say that if Range is not quite as bad as Plurality, then that's "as
well as hoped" for Range? I think most Range advocates have higher hopes.

Your claim that strategic Range voters are actually sincere is not
different from choosing to believe that the Plurality winner is always the
favorite candidate of the most voters. Essentially Range comes with a
suggestion on how to rate candidates, that isn't motivated by the method's
incentives. And then no matter how people vote, you choose to interpret
that they followed the suggestion.

Kevin Venzke

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