[Election-Methods] RE : Re: Simple two candidate election

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Fri Dec 21 06:19:49 PST 2007


--- rob brown <rob at karmatics.com> a écrit :
> What  I was trying to do is establish a baseline for evaluating
> election methods (including ones that would be used for "real"
> elections with multiple discrete candidates).  So I wanted to start by
> discussing a type of election that does not have potential for cycles
> and all those complexities that Arrow stressed out about.
> I suggested that a "theoretically perfect" election can be held in the
> case where we are looking for a simple numerical value (of course, I
> am making the assumption that the closer the result is to a voters
> ideal, the happier the voter will be).  My understanding is that Arrow
> would have no problems with such an election.

I agree. I would say this method doesn't contradict Arrow's theorem because
it doesn't satisfy "unrestricted domain." You aren't allowed to rank the
options in whatever order you like.

> If, however, this is not agreed on (and I have reason to think it
> isn't, by the Range voting people specifically), it seems pointless to
> talk about condorcet vs. range vs. approval.  Since we can't even
> agree on what makes makes a theoretically "ideal"  election in simpler
> cases where we have no possibility of cycles and all that ugly stuff.

To some extent I agree, in that there are plenty of things not worth
discussing if you have a more fundamental disagreement. I'm not going to
argue about cycle resolution with someone who thinks the idea of pairwise
contests is a distraction.

Kevin Venzke

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