[Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election

Jobst Heitzig heitzig-j at web.de
Fri Dec 21 00:40:28 PST 2007


Dear Ian!

Well, "period" ist not a very good argument in a scientific discussion...

I didn't mean to define "democracy" since that would certainly require more than just saying what a democratic *single-winner decision method* is. But on the latter I agree we do seem to have different opinions.

Also, when I said "equal power" I did not imply that "power" should be interpreted as "getting what I want". Such an interpretation would not be helpful, as you rightfully pointet out. In my opinion, the only meaningful way to define "power" in the context of a single-winner decision is how much influence on the outcome one has. One straightforward way to measure this influence is to look at how the winning probabilities change when the voter's behaviour changed. 

A member of a minority has no influence at all under majority rule since she cannot change the winning probabilities. Under random ballot, she has exactly the same influence on the winning probabilities as any other voter. 

So, when you favour majority vote over random ballot, then maybe you do so because it seems more "efficient" in electing a "good" option -- but that is a different aspect than the question of whether it is democratic. Sadly, efficiency and democracy are not the same goals.

Yours, Jobst


> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
> Von: "Ian Fellows" <ifellows at ucsd.edu>
> Gesendet: 21.12.07 00:41:13
> An:  "rob brown" <rob at karmatics.com>
> CC: <election-methods at electorama.com>
> Betreff: RE: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election


> 
> "The reason is simple: no majoritarian method can ever be democratic because
> it allows 51% of the  electorate to consistently keep the other 49% of the
> electorate from having any power at all"
> 
> Perhaps you have a different definition of democracy than I do.
> 
> "The simplest democratic method in the two-options case, as with more
> options, is random ballot."
> 
> err... Then either 51% or 49% of the population would have no power based on
> which ballot was picked. If you have a binary choice someone will not get
> what they want, and those people should be in the minority, period.
> 
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com
> [mailto:election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com]On Behalf Of Jobst
> Heitzig
> Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2007 12:38 PM
> To: rob brown
> Cc: election-methods at electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] Simple two candidate election
> 
> 
> Dear Rob!
> 
> As you may expect, I am not at all of the opinion that majority rule is
> perfect, no matter how few options there are. The reason is simple: no
> majoritarian method can ever be democratic because it allows 51% of the
> electorate to consistently keep the other 49% of the electorate from
> having any power at all, whereas a democratic method required everybody
> to have the same amount of power. In this sense, majority vote is far
> from being "fair".
> 
> The simplest democratic method in the two-options case, as with more
> options, is random ballot. In those unfortunate situations in which it
> cannot be guaranteed that both options are constitutional, random ballot
> should perhaps be modied in a way which ensures that only an option with
> at least, say, 5% support may win. (With more than two options, random
> ballot is of course not optimal since it does not encourage voter
> cooperation to elect good compromise options but rather elects polar
> options. D2MAC solves this problem while still being democratic.)
> 
> Yours, Jobst
> 
> rob brown schrieb:
> > My understanding has been that in a simple two candidate election,
> > there isn't any need for alternative election methods, and all the
> > issues that condorcet/approval/range etc attempt to solve simply
> > disappear.  A plain old majority vote is "perfect", as long as there
> > really are only two candidates.  There is no conflict between strategy
> > vs. sincerity, and there is a single Nash equilibrium -- which is
> > simply that everyone picks the candidate they prefer.
> >
> > Is this controversial?  For instance, could a two candidate election
> > be improved by, say, collecting information about how *much* each
> > voter likes or dislikes the candidates in question?  Assuming at least
> > some honest voters, this approach might be able to improve the
> > "maximum net tangible utility" ("tangible" meaning we are only
> > counting the happiness with the results themselves, and ignoring such
> > less-measurable utility such as "feeling of fairness" or "elimination
> > of resentment" or "long term satisfaction with the election process
> > itself").
> >
> >  My own opinion has always been that the (perceived?) fairness of
> > "everyone's vote counts the same" outweighs any desire for "maximum
> > net tangible utility."  I'd even go so far as to say that this would
> > be true even if we knew all votes were honest (say we put everyone on
> > a perfectly accurate lie detector).
> >
> > So, I am quite happy with plain old majority vote for a two candidate
> > election.  But I am encountering those who seem to disagree with this,
> > and who don't seem to have the same concept of "fairness" as I do.
> > I'm curious if people here see this as a legitimately controversial
> > issue.
> >
> >  Thanks,
> >  -rob
> >
> > ----
> > various voting related stuff at karmatics.com:
> >  http://karmatics.com/voting/movienite.html
> >  http://karmatics.com/voting/bargraphs.html
> >  http://karmatics.com/voting/bars-demo.html
> >  http://karmatics.com/voting/rank.html
> >
> >  http://karmatics.com/docs/collective-self-interest-fallacy.html
> >  http://karmatics.com/docs/evolution-and-wisdom-of-crowds.html
> > ----
> > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
> >
> >
> >
> 
> 
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
> 
> 
> 


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