[Election-Methods] RE : Is the Condorcet winner always the best?
stepjak at yahoo.fr
Mon Dec 10 13:46:20 PST 2007
--- Diego Santos <diego.renato at gmail.com> a écrit :
> Suppose this scenario:
> 46: A >> B > C
> 5: B >> A > C
> 5: B >> C > A
> 44: C >> B > A
> B beats A and C, but he is approved for only 10% of the voters.
In my opinion, if B is able to get fully 100% of the voters to give him a
ranking, then B is exactly the candidate for whose benefit I want to change
election methods. B is a better representative of the "middle" voter.
> A possible patch is to avoid rank-only ballots and ignore candidates with
> less than 1/2 approval (or total score, if range ballots are used) of the
> most approved candidate. This simple rule also solves DH3 pathology.
This only seems reliable if you assume that approval will be voted
I have a method called MAMPO which elects the most approved candidate
unless more than one has majority approval, in which case of the
majority-approved candidates the one with the lowest MMPO score is elected.
This method has an advantage in that it never rewards favorite betrayal.
Since I don't consider voted approval to be a reliable indicator of
anything (at least, it means no more to me than an explicit vote of any
kind), I would say that if you're concerned about "everyone's second
choice" winning without any strong support, perhaps you could use IRV or
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