[Election-Methods] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 42, Issue 77

[CLAY SHENTRUP]

On Dec 30, 2007 10:10 PM,
<election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com> wrote:
> Date: Sun, 30 Dec 2007 22:34:48 -0500
> From: Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com>
> Subject: [Election-Methods] cycles for: rcv ala tournament

> We say "rcv", claiming that the IRV backers have done well in promoting
> "almost" what we want to sell - we are basically agreed on ballots, but go
> our own ways on counting votes.

approval voting is better and simpler.  condorcet is an utter waste of time.

==
> From: "rob brown" <rob at karmatics.com>
> Subject: [Election-Methods] hypothetical question re: Approval

> Basically it is a question about whether Approval voting benefits if the
> voters have perfect -- or near perfect -- information about how others will
> vote.

if you have perfect information about how others will vote, then all
voting methods are the same.  condorcet.

approval voting is less harmed by strategic voting than
condorcet/borda/irv/plurality
http://rangevoting.org/StratHonMix.html

> Imagine a situation where there is an important, contentious election, that
> will be held over the internet...
> Now, the question at hand is, do you allow voters to see the current totals?

no!  that aids in strategic voting, which although it is less harmful
to approval voting than other methods, is still not good.

> So...does allowing people to see the current results cause problems?

yes.  but less so with approval voting than with most other methods.

> I would guess that a possible downside is that it could make it susceptible
> to cycles (i.e. feedback loops), causing people to keep having to change
> their vote if they want to be maximally strategic.

which would be no different whether you are talking about any _other_ method.

> The upside is that it does not give an advantage to someone for having more
> information about the preferences of others than other voters do, since all
> have the same information.
> Any thoughts?

yeah.  why are you asking election theory 101 questions to a group of
people who supposedly study this issue avidly.  this is like a
question someone asks in the first couple hours of reading a wiki on
voting methods.  the fact that you feel the need to ask this, as if
it's not obvious, is shocking.

this is why i called you a "newb" when i first encountered you - and
you are proving me right again and again by demonstrating
mind-breaking examples of flawed logic, and an inability to grasp
elementary aspects of game theory.

Paul wrote:
> > To give context to my answer, I think Approval would be a perfectly good
> > method for a party to adopt for its primary. It's darn near perfect for
> > allowing me to express my first choice plus whoever I think has a better
> > chance of winning than my first choice, assuming I want my party's candidate
> > to win even if he's my last choice in the primary.... I think it is
> > inappropriate for general elections for any number of technical reasons.

then you are confused and/or misinformed.

> > Alas, the problem is that much more "voting power" would be given to the
> > voting junkies who stayed online and kept changing their ballots than to the
> > folks who spent a lot of time coming up with one ballot, submitted it, and
> > then went to bed. Scary.

no more scarier than with any other voting method.  and the fact that
you do not understand this is illustrative of your relatively low
level of expertise in this field.