[Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise (correction)

[Howard Swerdfeger]

Forest W Simmons wrote:
> Below where I said "unlike Borda" I should have said "unlike D2MAC."  
> Neither the Borda solution nor the reverse plurality solution requires 
> anything other than the ordinal preferences.
> 
> So the deterministic solutions that do not depend on some form of vote 
> trading are insensitive to whether or not the voters are inclined to 
> approve C.
> 
> Perhaps we could refine the challenge to ask for methods that elect C 
> with near certainty when the two factions are
> 
> 55 A 100 C 80 B 0
> 45 B 100 C 80 B 0
> 
> but almost surely do not elect C with when the two factions are
> 
> 55 A 100 C 20 B 0
> 45 B 100 C 20 B 0
> 
> assuming throughout optimal strategical voting under near perfect 
> information.
> 
> It seems to me that vote trading and/or randomness are needed to solve 
> this challenge.
> 

I am inclined to agree with you. however, I am not willing to give up 
hope on a third type of method yet.

I would say that on a lower level you need"
  "A method that makes it optimal for an individual voter to vote with 
true preference."

the 3 methods I have noticed identified so far are vote trading, 
randomized ballots, and hiding information from the voter.

your assumption of "near perfect information" obviously eliminates the 
last one. Both of the methods that are left reduce to giving the voters 
good reason to vote the truth. I think it is a good idea to keep that in 
mind when devising future systems.