[Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi,

--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <abd at lomaxdesign.com> a écrit :
> At 09:04 AM 8/22/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> >I wouldn't choose it either. This comment of mine is a response to you
> >seeming to claim that if a method allows equal-ranking and truncation,
> >this is a sufficient condition for it to be called "Condorcet/Approval."
> >
> >If that's not what you were saying than I wonder what you meant in your
> >first mail that used the term "Condorcet/Approval"?
> 
> I was not aware when I wrote that of a method called, specifically 
> "Condorcet/Approval." I now see a wiki page on it, specifically on 
> Improved Condorcet/Approval. I was not claiming that any Condorcet 
> method allowing equal ranking and truncation was *this* particular 
> method. In particular, I did not state that approval would be used to 
> resolve cycles.

To be clear, I thought you were claiming that any method (not just a
Condorcet method) that allows such votes could simply be called a mix
of Condorcet and Approval. That's why I brought up ER-IRV.

> There are lots of Condorcet methods, of course. But allowing equal 
> ranking and truncation causes most of them to take on aspects of 
> Approval, and, of course, voters could elect to cast what are 
> essentially approval ballots. If all of them did, I would assume that 
> the Approval winner would win....

If the method strictly satisfies Condorcet, then yes, the candidate with
the most votes would have to win.

However, MinMax (pairwise opposition), which does still determine its
winner strictly from the strengths of pairwise contests, would not
necessarily elect the approval winner on such votes. On the other hand,
it satisfies FBC and LNHarm.

Kevin Venzke


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