[Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff

[Peter Barath]

>>1. If there is a Condorcet-winner she/he/it wins. If there is
>>    not, the Approval winner wins.

>Sure. That's been proposed many times. However,
>it's not a very good method. First of all, it is
>blatantly obvious, if you care to look, that the
>Condorcet winner is sometimes *not* the best
>winner, by far.

I guess this is an unjust blame because this thing
affect all voting methods. Even in a two-candidate
contest where every considerable method becomes
Plurality, it's possible that the minority has
stronger preference, so the winner is not the
social optimum.

(The only defense against this is the money voting, the
Clarke-tax, which is - I think - treated also a little
unjustly. At least the theoretical honor should be given
for showing the possibility of strategy-freeness.
And who knows, one day it can be proven even practical
in some circumstances.)

Peter Barath

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