[Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff, Lomax

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi,

--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <abd at lomaxdesign.com> a écrit :
>> At 01:29 PM 8/16/2007, Diego Renato wrote:
>> We should resist TACTICAL bullet voting for the same reason that many 
>> other methods than plurality. Increase the overall satisfaction of the
>> voters.
> 
> It's an error. The one most harmed by "tactical" bullet-voting is the 
> voter who votes that way. Some analysts are confused by the fact that 
> it can look like tactical voting is advantageous.

> If a so-called "tactical voter" supposedly approves of two 
> candidates, but only votes for one, we must look at why. Let me 
> suggest why: the voter has a preference, and the preference is strong 
> enough to motivate the voter to bullet-vote. There is a contradiction 
> in the assumptions: weak preference is assumed if we think the voter 
> approves of two, and strong preference in the action of voting.
>
> The voter has a reason for voting that way! He wants his favorite to win!
>
> And there is *nothing* wrong with this.

Diego Renato's point is not that the voter is doing something wrong, it's
that it is undesirable that the voter should perceive that he can gain
an advantage by withholding information. It would be better if (in this
particular situation) the voter could approve both candidates without any
loss of advantage.

That's why Diego Renato went on to suggest a method where arguably a 
bullet vote is not likely to be optimal.

Kevin Venzke


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