[Election-Methods] RE : Corrected "strategy in Condorcet" section

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 08:49 AM 8/15/2007, Chris Benham wrote:
>I classify ballot-types purely by the type of information they collect
>(allow the voters to specify) and not by what the algorithm does with
>that information.

Generally, Range ballots, if they have sufficient resolution, would 
be quite functional as rank ballots. If I'm correct, they are 
Borda-count ballots with equal ranking allowed and many ranks vacant.

And it appears that Range with preference analysis triggering a 
runoff is better at maximizing SU than plain Range. (The simulations 
haven't been done, I think, but top-two Range has been simulated and 
improves results, and normally when there is a discrepancy between 
the Range winner and the preference winner -- someone who beats the 
Range winner by pairwise analysis -- the pairwise winner would be number two.)

Analyzing the Range ballots that way and triggering a runoff when 
preference analysis indicates it causes the combined method to 
satisfy the Majority Criterion as to the overall process. It would 
*not* simply choose the preference winner, for if the Range ballot 
has not been badly distorted by misguided strategic exaggeration, 
there would be a small collective preference for the majority winner, 
but a larger collective preference, held by a minority of voters, for 
the Range winner. Under those conditions it would be, I suspect, 
common that the majority would effectively consent to the Range 
winner, either explicitly or by not bothering to vote in the runoff, 
since they are already getting a good result either way.

But the supporters of the Range winner are motivated to vote, by the 
terms of the problem....

This would make Range into a system that is much more compatible with 
the principles of deliberative process, which always involve 
immediate majority consent.