[Election-Methods] RE : Corrected "strategy in Condorcet" section

[Kevin Venzke]

Juho,

--- Juho <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk> a écrit :
>>>> I think margins does give a clear reason to not vote for weak
>>>> candidates,
>>>> especially if there's a chance they're strong enough to get a  
>>>> pairwise
>>>> win.
>>>
>>> I still miss the concrete waterproof example. (Sorry if I should have
>>> known which one it is.)
>>
>> Another example? The 49 24 27 scenario shows that margins can do this.
> 
> Yes, that scenario shows that in some situations some strategies work  
> in margins but not in winning votes.

The point really isn't that they don't work in WV, it's that they 
aren't *needed* in WV.

Also, in the situations where the strategy *does not* work, it rarely
does anything bad, either.

> I'm trying to find examples that would be damaging to  
> margins in the sense that they would occur often in typical  
> elections, 

Is it not pretty damaging if voters don't trust the method to deal with
votes for weak candidates?

> would be risk free to strategists, 

We have this

> easy to implement,  

We have this

> tolerable to measurement errors etc.

Even if you misjudge, the worst you get is your preferred frontrunner

> And I tried to pinpoint  
> weaknesses in the presented scenarios (why they would no be as big a  
> threat as the extreme/theoretical cases first seem to indicate.)

Even when you show that margins might pick a good winner, that doesn't
show that it was a good idea to vote for a candidate who could not
believably win according to polls.

> > If you believe your favorite candidate is strong enough to beat the
> > better frontrunner but not strong enough to win, you shouldn't vote  
> > for
> > him. It's not even safe enough to rank them equally, since you might
> > need to compensate for voters with the same preferences you have  
> > but who
> > are choosing to vote sincerely.
> 
> I'll try to find some (more) problem free set of votes for such a  
> situation. (Success not guaranteed.)

I don't understand what you're saying. What good can it do to show a
scenario where there *isn't* a problem?

> > You frequently say that conditions are so uncertain that who can say
> > whether a strategy is good to use. But surely voters will at least  
> > believe
> > they can gauge whether their favorite candidate is likely to win.
> 
> Often that may be the case, but it is also quite typical to elections  
> that the winner and/or #2 are not known beforehand. And individual  
> voters often have different understanding, and all the candidates  
> claim to be close to winning. It is also possible that voters vote  
> against "pre-declared" winners.

It doesn't matter if voters have different understandings; it only matters
that a voter believes their own understanding is close enough.

It's a rather moot point in any case since just because a voter may
not realize they should use favorite betrayal doesn't mean that they
didn't *need* to.

> > The WV strategy proposal didn't involve bullet voting. The whole point
> > is that it didn't involve bullet voting.
> 
> Didn't quite get this. I used bullet voting as a synonym to  
> truncation in a three candidate race.

The WV strategy allows for votes like C>B in a three-candidate race,
which isn't bullet-voting.

> >>>> Yes, I meant sincere voting in Condorcet. I don't believe I can
> >>>> provide you a method that would be immune to strategic voting,  
> >>>> but I
> >>>> do believe that in some environments most people would vote  
> >>>> sincerely
> >>>> anyway. This is because on average sincere voting can be claimed to
> >>>> bring them the best results.
> >>>
> >>> This is not really true with respect to votes for candidates that
> >>> you do
> >>> not think can win.
> >>
> >> True for candidates that have no chances.
> >
> > And this is a problem. Voters shouldn't have to weed weak  
> > candidates out
> > of their ranking before they vote. The method should just ignore those
> > candidates.
> 
> Planning to analyse this with "realistic" votes.

What good is it. Voters can't foresee whether an election is going to
turn out "realistic."

> > In the first round you vote FOR one candidate. You also vote  
> > AGAINST one
> > candidate. If someone has more than half of the FOR votes, they are
> > elected. If someone has more than half of the AGAINST votes, they are
> > disqualified. Then the second round is between the two candidates with
> > the most FOR votes who have not been disqualified.
> 
> I'm always a bit careful with the "against" votes. If there are e.g.  
> three strong parties the supporters of the other parties might vote  
> the candidate of one party out. 

???

That's the whole point.

If supporters of two parties make up more than half the voters, and they
all agree that the third party candidate is the worst, that candidate
shouldn't win.

> In this situation it is also possible  
> that some unknown candidate or a candidate that nobody expected to  
> win and that therefore didn't get too many negative votes would win.

Negative votes only count if somebody gets more than half.

The unknown candidate has to beat at least one other candidate in the
second round.

You can never win without being in the top three in the first round.

Kevin Venzke


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