[Election-Methods] Two replies

[Juho]

Here are some remaining comments and responses to the questions. No  
new material, just confirming the presented viewpoints.

On Aug 11, 2007, at 4:37 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:

> At 05:03 PM 8/10/2007, Juho wrote:
>> In the light of this example it doesn't matter how the "sincere"
>> votes are derived or where they come from. Any method and logic is
>> ok. It could be based on terms "sincere" and "utilities", or not. The
>> only criterion is technical by nature, i.e. that the voter uses the
>> values in some other way than using mostly min and max values.
>
> In other words, even if your vote of max for one and min for  
> another, and no intermediate values for anyone (maybe they are also  
> max or min, or you left them blank) is an accurate reflection of  
> your preferences, i.e., it is sincere, then your vote is "strategic."

I don't want to define/redefine "strategic". The technical properties  
of the votes are enough.

I wrote:
>> Range could ignore also a clear majority
>> opinion.

I should have written "a clear majority and utility opinion as a  
result of strategic voting".

> >  One could e.g. translate utility values 1
> >A=90, B=80 and 1 B=90, A=70 to actual votes 1 A=100, B=0 and 1 B=90,
> >A=70.
>
> So this is two voters. Thus it is 50-50 as far as first preference  
> is concerned. (And we can imagine that this is two whole sets of  
> voters voting identically.) Fine. If I'm correct, Juho is asserting  
> that, if the votes are translated as stated, the outcome is "bad."
>
> Yet what method is going to do better than Range in this example?

Range changes the winner depending on the level of strategic voting.  
Most other methods would give a tie.

---------------------------

On Aug 11, 2007, at 5:50 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:

>> >         D       R1      R2
>> > 50:     100     80      70
>> > 30:     70      100     90
>> > 20:     0       0       100
>> >         ---------------------
>> >         7100    7000    8200

> In any case, what is "bad" about this scenario?

The success of the strategic voters.

>> They were intended to be strategic/exaggerating republicans whose
>> sincere opinion could have been e.g. R2=100, R1=90, D=70.

> These are not normalized utilities, on what basis are they made  
> commensurable?

The problems rose from some voters normalizing or exaggerating and  
some not.

> So on what basis does Juho assume utilities as he did. Why is the  
> worst candidate in the set a "70"?
>
> He is postulating circumstances that are unreal.

Any reasons and votes that give other than min and max values will do.

> A major contradiction in Juho's argument is that he assumes that  
> voters would vote a weak vote in Range but that they would  
> accurately predict which form of Approval vote would serve them  
> best, and they would not vote a weak vote in Approval.

I don't want to claim anything about Approval or Approval like  
strategies.

> If the Ds considered R2 a poor choice, why did they rate him at 70?  
> *That is a high rating.*

They didn't consider R2 to be a poor choice (although R2 was to them  
the worst choice).

> Who would be a better winner?

R1 and D based on social utilities (and according to the choices of  
many methods).

Juho



		
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