[Election-Methods] Response to Schudy re Range vs Approval voting

[Juho]

On Aug 9, 2007, at 20:14 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:

> I've been over and over this point, there is little in this post  
> that is new. I'd suggest reading it carefully.

In this discussion I'm quite sensitive to different wordings that are  
used when describing Range.

> And if you wish to continue asserting that Range can "cause a mess"  
> when voters vote a mixture of "sincere" voting and Approval-style  
> voting, please define "sincere" in a manner that we could agree  
> upon, define what a sincere Range vote is, and how, and *how much*  
> the voters are harmed by voting sincerely, and what effect this has  
> on society as a whole.

I used term "sincere" roughly to refer to voters marking their  
personal candidate utility values in the ballots. Or if you don't  
like the word "utility" then we can just talk about putting  
candidates on the value axis without putting any special emphasis on  
the min and max values.

The voters could be harmed considerably in some cases. There have  
been several examples. One could e.g. translate utility values 1  
A=90, B=80 and 1 B=90, A=70 to actual votes 1 A=100, B=0 and 1 B=90,  
A=70.

The effect on the society could be e.g. bad election results (e.g.  
worse candidate A elected due to strategic voting) or Range becoming  
Approval in practice.

I think we have covered all this before. Let's try to avoid repeating  
the cycle.

> "Insincere" refers to reversing a preference;

That's one option. In natural language I'd include also other cases.

(sincere votes)
>>  You seem to be recommending the voters to primarily do so,
>
> I do recommend not reversing preferences. As to the expression of  
> so-called sincere ratings -- what is that?

Defined above. (I didn't refer to reversals specifically.)

> -- I suggest normalization, for starters, in nearly all  
> circumstances. In some, what I call the "first normalization" would  
> remain proper, not the second.
>
> (The first normalization: the voter considers *all* possible  
> candidates, not just those on the ballot. The voter assigns 100% to  
> the best of these and 0% to the worst. This is pretty much what  
> Warren does with his simulations, to generate "sincere" and "not  
> normalized" utilities. But by assuming that all voters have the  
> same internal scale, there is a normalization. Other utilities are  
> proportional. An assumption is made that they are linear, though  
> various distributions of utilities are used.)
>
> (The second normalization: the voter considers all candidates on  
> the ballot, including a write-in, if any. The voter assigns 100% to  
> the favorite and 0% to the worst. Another variation of this would  
> not include any write-ins. Again, other utilities would be presumed  
> to fall in the middle somewhere, but that is actually a separate  
> issue.)
>
> (And how are so-called sincere internal utilities translated to  
> Range Votes, when they are not at the extremes? There is no fixed  
> standard. Approval-style voting could be, in ordinary usage of the  
> term, "sincere." That is, the voter is saying, "I'll be about as  
> happy with either of these, and about as unhappy with either of  
> those." This does *not* necessarily mean that the voter has no  
> measurable preference, if only given the choice of two. It does  
> mean that the voter is more likely, perhaps, to stay home in a  
> runoff, but that is not guaranteed.)

It seems you recommend not to normalize the estimated frontrunners to  
min and max.

>>  With this I think we are back in the
>> original claim that Range may create a mess if some voters vote
>> sincerely (and maybe are guided to do so) and some strategically.
>
> No such mess has been alleged specifically. Rather, Juho and others  
> continue to claim that a mess is created, but not *specific*  
> scenario that deserves the name is mentioned.

There have been examples. See e.g. the example I gave above.

> Suppose we have a pizza election. Two friends are choosing a pizza,  
> using Range Voting. They express, with their votes, not only what  
> they prefer, but how strongly. Certainly, the person who votes  
> Approval style is more likely to get what he wants -- indeed it is  
> guaranteed -- than the one who votes "sincerely." This is quite  
> like two friends having a discussion about it. One says, I like  
> Artichoke, but Mushroom is okay with me. The other says, wow! I  
> *love* Mushroom and I *hate* Artichoke.
>
> Which pizza do they choose? Routinely, in ordinary human  
> interaction, we give precedence to strongly expressed preferences.  
> Do we question the sincerity of these preferences? We may, if  
> voting over time shows a pattern. But who is to say, even then. A  
> person's preferences may change. If a person always expresses  
> strong preference, we may think them histrionic, but usually we  
> will treat their preference as strong; however, in some cases, we  
> may also start to treat our own as strong, if we never get what we  
> want.
>
> It balances out. And I expect the same with elections.

Do you mean in the first election the strategists might win but in  
the second election most voters would vote in Approval style?

> In Range the preference of a majority can be passed over for the  
> broader satisfaction of the whole electorate, including a minority  
> with a stronger expressed preference.
>
> *This is not a problem,*

Coming voluntarily back from Approval style to sincere votes is not  
as bad as starting from and recommending the use of sincere votes to  
all. (But it doesn't necessarily work that way either.)

Juho




		
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