[Election-Methods] Response to Schudy re Range vs Approval voting

Juho juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk
Tue Aug 7 21:11:38 PDT 2007


On Aug 8, 2007, at 3:42 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:

> At 05:44 PM 8/7/2007, Juho wrote:
>> On Aug 7, 2007, at 23:13 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>> > Giving someone rating points is giving them votes. Range 100 is
>> > like having 100 votes, to cast in an Approval election. If Range
>> > gives some putative advantage to "strategic voters," so too does
>> > Approval, to blocks of same. It is an imaginary objection to Range,
>> > accusing it of fomenting what other methods *require*.
>>
>> Approval doesn't give the voters any other alternative but to use the
>> min and max values. If one wants to describe Range in a way that
>> avoids the problems of giving strategic/exaggerating voters more
>> power then it is best to describe it like you did, as an Approval
>> like election with option to use also less powerful values than the
>> (generally used) min and max values are.
>
> But that is what Range is!
>
> Does the method change based on how we describe it?

In some sense yes. In practice the situation is much more complex but  
in theory one could say that: 1) Strategic voters will study the  
method in detail and they will find the most efficient strategic way  
to vote irrespective of how the method is described. 2) Sincere  
voters will vote in the way they were told to vote.

In Range this means that if you present Range as a method that elects  
the candidate with best utility sum after the voters have marked  
their personal utilities in the ballots, then sincere voters have  
been advised in a way that makes them vote differently than what the  
strategists will do. If you present range as a method where the votes  
are expected to promote the candidates with either min or max values,  
or with intermediate values if they don't want to use their full  
voting power for some reason, then strategic and sincere votes are  
closer to each others (some additional but more complex strategic  
options that sincere voters might not use may still remain).

(A third quite common way to describe Range is to use normalised  
values.)

> Absolutely, someone could describe Range, on a ballot, in a way  
> that would encourage voters to waste their vote. Consider it an  
> intelligence test. If you see through this defective advice, your  
> vote will count for more!

Yes. This is something I would not like to happen. It is better to  
try to give all voters the same power, irrespective if they are less  
strategic or less analytical.

> But I would never support such a description being on a ballot.

Yes, it is too late to try to educate voters using the ballot. They  
should know beforehand.

> The description should inform the voter how the voter's marks will  
> be used. One of the descriptions that has been suggested (by me?)  
> is precisely that "You have 10 votes, and you may cast as many of  
> them as you like for a given candidate, without any restriction on  
> how many you cast for another candidate. The winner will be the  
> candidate with the most votes. For each candidate, mark the  
> position on the ballot corresponding to the number of votes you  
> wish to cast for that candidate."

Maybe some example votes would clarify to the voters what the typical  
voting patterns are. This description may still lead to different  
interpretations by them.

> That's Range 10.

(This naming policy btw has the problem that nowadays I don't know  
what method people are talking about when they say "Range 2". You  
could mean the ability to give from zero to two votes or the ability  
to give two different kind of values.)

Juho

>


		
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