[Election-Methods] Corrected "strategy in Condorcet" section

[Juho]

On Aug 2, 2007, at 2:52 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:

>> Yes, as noted many times, Condorcet ignores preference strengths, and
>> the best explanation is that it does no because they are too
>> difficult to measure (or actually - to take into use) reliably in a
>> competitive election.
>
> But it's easy to collect the voters stated preferences and  
> strengths, it is not difficult at all. Nor is it difficult to use  
> the information; Juho's argument is circular.
>
> We take voters word as to their preferences, why not their  
> preference strengths?
>
> Please, I haven't seen one argument for doing this here. The  
> argument I've seen is that voters who vote intermediate votes are  
> stupid, and that cunning Approval style voters will take advantage  
> of them.

The votres' "stated preferences" are easy to collect but in a  
competitive environment voters tend to exaggerate. I guess the basic  
problem is the feeling you get when Bush wins Gore and you have voter  
G=100, B=80 and your neighbour has voted B=100, G=0.

Intermediate votes may not do harm in some cases but as a main rule  
competitive voters are likely to use mins and maxes as efficiently as  
they can.

> But in two stages, you can have your Condorcet cake and optimize  
> satisfaction as well.

Some guidance for reading my comments. I tend to split the cases in  
two categories. Sincere elections => Range ok. COmpetitive elections  
=> better to go for Condorcet or Approval or some other strategy  
resistant but more coarse methods. Trying to put these (opinion  
strength measurements and competitiveness) in one package causes me  
confusion. If you can prove that some such system works I'll include  
that method in my favourite methods list.

> You get people to vote sincerely by trusting what they say and  
> giving it to them!

There is some truth in this. I'm however afraid than in many cases  
the competitive instincts and fear of others using strategies will  
take over.

> You have an election between Al Gore, G W Bush, and Osama Bin  
> Laden, I'll pick the current Bete Noir, he  deserves the  
> approbation in my opinion. If I thought that there was a real risk  
> that Bin Laden would win the election, it wasn't just a joke, I  
> would seriously consider, in Range, voting max for both Bush and  
> Gore. And I think Bush is pretty bad!

Note that Condorcet / ranked ballots would be good here. Ballot  
Gore>Bush>Osama says Gore>Bush with maximum strength, Gore>Osama with  
maximum strength, and Bush>Osama with maximum strength.

> The basic rule (in the absence of strategies) in Range is to  
> express one's sincere opinions.

Correct. The only problem is that the strategies can be applied so  
often. In Condorcet the strategic opportunities can at least be  
claimed to be rare.

Juho



		
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