[Election-Methods] RE : Corrected "strategy in Condorcet" section, Chris

[Kevin Venzke]

Chris,

--- Forest W Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu> a écrit :
> >Kevin Venzke wrote:
> >
> >>I suggest this two-round method. It's not Condorcet-efficient or even
> >>rank ballot but I think it would be an improvement, and it's quite 
> simple:
> >>
> >>In the first round you vote FOR one candidate. You also vote AGAINST
> one
> >>candidate. If someone has more than half of the FOR votes, they are
> >>elected. If someone has more than half of the AGAINST votes, they are
> >>disqualified. Then the second round is between the two candidates with
> >>the most FOR votes who have not been disqualified.
> >>
> >>I think this is much better as a two-round method than a one-round rank
> >>method.
> >>
> >I think this uses an overly restrictive ballot  and would have horrible 
> >clone problems and fails  Independence
> >from Irrelevant Ballots without very good justification.

This method is intended to be simple yet still give good results in
likely scenarios. It's a niche method.

The basic idea is to handle at least the case that there are three viable
candidates, with an underlying political spectrum (so that the candidates
can be called left/right/center).

So yes, the ballot is restrictive, and yes, if a fourth major candidate
attracts votes then you will see problems. (But note that the incentives
of the method should make a fourth viable candidate unlikely, just as
FPP makes three unlikely.) As for IIB, well, Top-Two Runoff already fails
that. This is just an improvement of that method.

> >I am sure that something that uses approval ballots in the first round 
> >could be much better. A while ago I suggested
> >that the two qualifiers should be the  Approval winner and the 
> candidate 
> >with the most approval opposition to the
> >AW. How do you see your suggested method as being better than that?

I don't think your suggestion is too bad. However, I think the strategy
is harder for the voter to understand.

Also, I think there is a strategy problem that I tried to avoid in the 
case that your favorite candidate is left and you think he may be able 
to defeat center head-to-head.

In my method you most likely vote for left and vote against right. (Though
if you are confident left can at least beat right, you might not do this.)

In your method, if you approve both left and center, you not only can
make center the AW, you are also unable to provide any opposition for
left against center. You could cause the second round to be center vs.
right. If you bullet vote for left, there is a greater chance that
center will be shut out of the second round (which is something I, at
least, want to try to avoid).

I have a hunch that people will be more eager to "vote against" a 
candidate they perceive to be an opponent, than to give a lower 
preference to a candidate they may need as a compromise.

Kevin Venzke


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