[Election-Methods] DYN is probably better, but less proposable

[Forest W Simmons]

I understand why Mike thinks the public is not ready for DYN, yet.

I think if Approval were adopted, then the logic of DYN would soon 
become obvious.

Also, keep DYN in mind the next time you have an election of some kind 
in a small group.

The three main advantages of  DYN over plain Approval are ...

(1) Joe voter doesn't have to strategize or even worry about approving 
or disapproving candidates that he knows little about.

(2) The proxies have accurate information for their strategizing.

(3) It comes very close to satisfying the strong version of the FBC.

Points (1) and (3) are its best selling points for the general public.  

Point (2) is the one that gives DYN an actual advantage over Approval 
as far as results are concerned.  For example, accurate information is 
important for electing the Condorcet Winner when there is one.  In the 
current environment of Fox News style disinformation, Approval and 
Range will have a hard time living up to their potential.

Suppose for example we have the ratings profile ... 

52 (A,100) (B,20) (C,0)
23 (B,100) (C,60) (A,0)
25 (C,100) (B,60) (A,0)

It would be easy for Murdoch to report distorted faction sizes so that 
the A faction is thought to have only 48% support, and that that C is 
considered the leading contender.

With that disinformation, Range and Approval strategizers would 
recommend the A supporters to give B maximum support. "Anybody but C."

This would never happen in DYN.

Forest


Mike wrote ...
>
>DYN is a good combination of Approval and delegation of voting power to 
>favorite proxies. Power is delegated only when the voter is uncertain 
(or 
>wants to get the best strategic result), and the candidate delegates 
have 
>good information on which to base their votes.
>
>Methods that aren't limited by the usual traditions can be relatively 
>strategy-free, and briefly-defined and understandable to the public.
>
>But, when I and others have proposed non-traditional methods, methods 
using 
>input other than voters' ballots, we've encountered strong opposition 
from 
>people. I've even gotten consistent rejection for the candidate 
withdrawal 
>option, on the grounds that it supposedly gives candidates power to 
overrule 
>voters.
>
>So, as good as non-traditional methods could be, I don't propose them 
for 
>public elections anymore, because of the rejection that they've 
elicited in 
>the past.