[EM] election-methods Digest, Vol 34, Issue 22

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 03:28 PM 4/21/2007, Juho wrote:
>Some voters may think that the candidates know the political
>questions better and are better up to date than the voter himself/ 
>herself. Some think the other way around. Both OK. The voter may be
>confident in his/her opinions and finds deviations from them
>uncomfortable. Another voter learns from what the candidates say and
>changes his/her opinions accordingly.

In my opinion the one who properly decides if a voter is competent to 
vote on a topic that affects him or her is the voter himself or 
herself. The protection against incompetent voting in a 
direct/democracy Delegable Proxy or Asset Voting system is that the 
individual voter *may* vote, but is not required to and is not asked 
to by the system. The default is that someone you choose votes for 
you. But it is entirely up to you whether or not you want to vote on 
your own behalf.

With Asset Voting, to vote yourself you register as a candidate and 
simply vote for yourself. I expect that there might be some fee 
associated with registration, but it should be minimal, essentially 
enough to cover costs, and costs would be kept to a minimum. A 
booklet might be published listing all registered candidates in a 
jurisdiction, with a code to be used for actually voting. (Asset 
makes it practical for *many* candidates to make themselves 
available, because no longer are small numbers of votes wasted.)

(And this is, of course, in a system where direct voting is possible, 
direct voting in the assembly. It might be over the internet, it 
might not be. Asset makes it possible for direct voting to take 
place, because electors under asset are public voters and it is known 
who is carrying their votes in the assembly, so assembly votes can be 
adjusted as necessary by direct votes. Basic Asset Voting does not 
necessarily lead to the allowance of direct voting, it merely makes 
it possible.)

>Some voters may trust trust the candidates, some not. Both OK. The
>new method may be so good that it makes the candidates/ 
>representatives less corrupt than before. But there is also the risk
>that candidates will use their negotiating power (e.g. in Asset
>voting) to gain personal benefits.

Risk? I find this astonishingly naive. We are talking about 
candidates for public office, who will serve in assemblies with 
legislative power. The *status quo* is that many representatives 
already "use their negotiating power to gain personal benefits." 
Those benefits may be political -- which is not necessarily corrupt 
-- or personal, some of which involves corruption. What is so 
frequently overlooked by commentators on Asset Voting and Delegable 
Proxy is that there is *already* negotiation for the exercise of 
power, but it happens at the next state, in the legislature (as well 
as during campaigns, involving funding and support.)

So the question is not whether Asset will lead to the abuse of 
negotiating power, for such abuse, if it is abuse, already exists. 
The question, rather, is whether or not it will make it worse or better.

Remember, in Asset the votes are public. If I've voted for so-and-so, 
he or she may not know that I voted for him or her, but I know. And I 
know where my votes went, generally. If they go somewhere due to 
corrupt influence, why would I be satisfied with this?

In Asset systems as in Delegable Proxy, the voters main focus is on 
the voter's link to the hierarchy, and on the path up that hierarchy. 
It is far, far easier to watch that path, to watch what, precisely, 
is being done with one's vote, not only in seating members of the 
assembly, but in votes subsequent to that, than it is under current 
systems as well as in most of the more advanced systems being 
proposed. There is *responsibility.* Representation is still shared, 
in one sense, but in another it is *personal.* I can take my vote 
away from the representative. (In direct voting systems, I can do so 
by voting. In delegable proxy systems, we usually assume that the 
proxy can be revoked at any time, in addition to being effectively 
canceled on a vote per vote basis by a direct vote cast by the client.)

>  Some may consider it better not to
>open doors for the temptations,

If it weren't so damaging, this would be hilarious. We operate in a 
system which is thoroughly vulnerable and manipulable by special 
interests. The door is wide open *now*. With Asset, we can start to 
watch the door!

Delegable Proxy goes further, but delegable proxy, structurally, is a 
fractal. On the biological analogies, that's absolutely appropriate, 
but many people seem to have a lot of difficulty wrapping their head 
around it. I point out that, to the base level client, it looks 
extremely simple. There is a single clear path from the client to the 
top. That this path is cross-linked massively should not distract 
from that simplicity. But, still, DP would create top-level 
assemblies where the members have variable voting power, and some 
fear that this would give too much power to some individuals. I 
disagree, but propose Asset as something fairly equivalent that does 
not allow too much concentration in the hands of a single individual. 
(The voters could collectively decide to give all their votes to a 
single candidate, which would indeed give that candidate great power. 
But I think, first of all, that this is not a likely outcome, by any 
means, and it would only happen if, in fact, someone existed who was 
so massively trusted. In an Asset environment, this person would 
effectively appoint the legislature, the person could not keep the 
power for personal exercise.

Delegable Proxy and Asset both are systems of representative 
democracy (possibly combined with direct democracy) that allow the 
citizen vast freedom in the choice of representative. The freedom 
seems absolute in delegable proxy, and restricted in a way under 
Asset, but the difference is illusory. Top-level assemblies for large 
jurisdictions *must* restrict participation rights; this fact has 
typically led analysts to conclude that direct democracy is 
impossible. But that is because the concept of separating voting from 
floor rights, quite simply, was overlooked. It is the right to 
participate directly in deliberation that must be restricted. Scale 
does not make it impossible for everyone who wishes to do so to vote.

Again, many considerations of direct democracy have noted, correctly, 
that the average citizen cannot possibly have the resources to be 
able to vote intelligently on the complex decisions which need to be 
made in modern assemblies. And a likely result would be that only a 
subclass of citizens actually vote, skewing the results toward those 
desired by the people who have or make the time. And fanatics and 
extremists are far more likely to do this than, say, the average 
worker. But proxy voting rebalances the situation. The average 
citizen remains represented, and the task of that citizen, 
politically, is reduced to making a good choice in proxy or Asset 
candidate, and then in watching that representative.

Both Asset and DP allow representation choices to be made on a small 
and intimate level while still concentrating representation on a large scale.

As to vulnerability to corruption, the issue is complex. DP is 
probably less vulnerable, but DP is not practical for political 
purposes, in many environments, unless base-level proxy assignments 
are secret. While both Asset and DP are, in my opinion, far less 
vulnerable to corruption than present systems, the possibility still 
exists. Whenever there are fixed nodes of power, there are weak 
points where corrupt leverage can be applied.

Fortunately, there is a solution which goes even further. And, 
miracle of miracles, it is a solution which can *precede* the 
creation of public Asset or DP systems. It is to create independent 
organizations which do not collect power. These are *not* 
governments, they do not have coercive power, they cannot tax or 
assess. They do not make collective decisions, in the end, though 
they may express the degree to which consensus has been found on an 
issue. This, of course, is FA/DP. It can start *now*. It merely seeks 
communication and coordination.

With FA/DP, the power, the resources, remain with the individual 
members, as well as with traditional organizations which these 
members create that are *not* Free Associations, though they may be 
DP in control structure.

A great deal already exists which bears this or that characteristic 
of FA/DP. Essentially, it's coming. Watch.