[EM] Definite Majority incompatible with a burial-resistance property
Chris Benham
chrisjbenham at optusnet.com.au
Wed Apr 4 10:41:14 PDT 2007
Kevin,
For a long time I had the idea that DMC had an anti-burial property that
might be called
"Approval Dominant Mutual Third Burial Resistance", which says that if
there are 3 candidates
X,Y,Z and X wins and is exclusively approved on more than a third of the
ballots then changing
some ballots from Y>X to Y>Z can't change the winner to Y.
I've claimed this is true (including I think on EM), but have now
discovered that this is incompatible
with Definite Majority (or at least with the combination of DM and
Condorcet).
34: A|B
17: C|A
49: B|A
A is the CW so DMC elects A.
34: A|B
17: C|A
26: B|C
23: BC|
B>C>A>B. Approvals: B49, C40, A34.
The original 49 B|A voters have all buried A, dividing into 26B|C and
23BC|. The DM set is {B}, but
the anti-burial property says "not B".
I think AWP (which is Schulze or River or Ranked Pairs measuring defeat
strength by "Approval Against")
does have the anti-burial property. (In the above example in AWP the
burying fails, changing the winner from
A to C.)
Among methods that use ranked ballots with an approval threshold
(allowing voters to rank among unapproved
candidates) this discovery has had the effect of somewhat raising my
regard of both ASM and AWP relative to DMC.
Chris Benham
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