[EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

[Brian Olson]

I'm not sure about rankings, but Warren's extension to ratings is neat and 
straightforward.

Rivest mentions that his three ballot checker machine would have to 
enforce the single-vote plurality rules as an extra check that could just 
be removed, losing nothing of the benefits of three-ballot.

Also, just as Approval is a two value rating summation system, three 
ballot extends naturally when moving beyond two values of rating.

Rivest explains at one point that the candidates all get between n and 2n 
marks for n voters. The traditional "vote" count is the counted marks 
minus n. In the same fashion, Warren has extended the ballot so that all 
candidates get between r*n and 2*r*n rating vote for a max rating of r and 
n voters. Subtract off r*n and you have the secure rating vote. Cool, huh?

http://rangevoting.org/Rivest3B.html

The down side is that since this directly accomplishes summation of the 
ratings, per-ballot-rating methods such as IRNR and raking-derivation to 
Borda or Condorcet/VRR are not possible.

Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/

On Fri, 29 Sep 2006, mrouse1 at mrouse.com wrote:

> Very interesting method. Just a quick question. The article mentions that
> rank-order methods would be really tough to do. Wouldn't the method just
> be two votes with the correct rank-order and one with the reverse order?
> If you wanted A>B>C, you'd have two votes for that and one for C>B>A.
> Borda would end up with the score A=4, B=3, C=2, which is the same order,
> just shifted. Condorcet might have problems with completion rules when
> there is a circular tie, but a Condorcet winner should be the same either
> way.
>
> I'd try to figure it out, but I'm at work now. :D
>
> Michael Rouse
> mrouse1 at mrouse.com
>
>
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