[EM] Ranked Preferences
Juho
juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk
Mon Oct 23 22:58:06 PDT 2006
Hello All,
Here is a new voting method for you to check. This method was created
as a result of a study on if Condorcet methods can be made more
expressive without losing their best properties. This method seemed
to me to be a quite natural path forward. I'm not quite sure if the
benefits outweigh the added complexity in all settings but at least
this study was an interesting one (on expressiveness but also on
different defence strategies). There are many variants of this
method. I picked one for you to comment. Please check and tell what
you like/dislike.
- Ballots may have preferences of different strength (e.g. A>>B>C>D>>>E)
- Worst candidates will be eliminated gradually during the
calculation process
- Eliminated candidates can not win any more but they are still
included in the preference calculations just like the non-eliminated
candidates
- The top strength of a ballot is the strength of the strongest
preference relation that still has non-eliminated candidates at both
sides of it
- Preference relations that are weaker than the top strength of the
ballot have no influence (they are counted as if they were "=")
- ">" is stronger than "="
- The unranked candidates are seen as ranked equal after the ranked
candidates (as usual)
- By default the strength of the preference relation between the
ranked and unranked canidates is the same as the strongest preference
in the original ballot (there are also other options)
- The voter may also indicate the strength herself (e.g. A>B>C>>)
- While there is more than one non-eliminated candidate left,
calculate the pairwise comparison matrix and eliminate candidates as
described below
For each ballot, when comparing x to y
- Add one point if x is ranked higher than y (top strength or higher)
- Add one point if x and y are ranked equal at top (including lower
strengths)
- Subtract one point if x is ranked lower than y (top strength or
higher)
- Subtract one point if x and y are ranked equal at bottom (including
lower strengths)
(Note that definitions of terms higher, lower and equal are relative
to the top strength of the ballot here.)
- Find out the worst comparison result of the non-eliminated
candidates in the matrix
- Eliminate those non-eliminated candidates whose worst comparison
result is equal to this
- Unless that would eliminate all remaining non-eliminated
candidates, in which case only one of them will be eliminated in
random (it could be also possible to randomly elect the winner here)
As I already noted there can be many variants of this method (and
many opinions as well) on e.g. the use of IRV-like elimination (not
perfect but simple), minmax, the existence and strength of the top
and bottom tie rules (I think they now stretch the discussion space
wide enough), margins, default ballot completion, comparison to the
already eliminated candidates, random and group elimination.
Thanks to Chris Benham for comments.
Juho Laatu
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