[EM] RE : Re: Combating the Approval Burr dilemma

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 05:10 PM 11/16/2006, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>If the method
>offers voters incentive to behave in such a way that when their faction
>is represented by multiple candidates, this faction is penalized, then
>as a result, political parties will not want to run multiple candidates
>appealing to the same portion of the electorate.

Probably true under just about any political system that is 
party-organized. Running multiple candidates is *expensive*. And 
you'd better know what you are doing.

The problem here is not the election system itself, in the example 
chosen, but that the party is not actually united on the two 
candidates. It is as if there are two parties.

Approval will not solve *this* problem, if the members of the 
factions refuse to sincerely approve the other party member, perhaps 
trying for the election of their own and perceiving that other party 
candidate as a threat to that.

But this is voluntary behavior on the part of the voters, 
individually, in the voting booth, and simply demonstrates that the 
party failed to nominate consensus candidates.

If I'm correct, the desired property is Independence from the 
Insertion of Clones, or something like that. Right?

A party which is two factions deeply divided is not a single party, 
no matter what it calls itself. It's a coalition.

IIC must require that voters vote sincerely. But in the example 
given, they don't vote sincerely.

Range would not solve this problem, because insincere voters would 
likely vote extremes, reducing the election, for them, to Approval/Plurality.