[EM] RE : Re: Range voting, zero-info strategy simulation (raphfrk)

[Kevin Venzke]

Raphfrk,

--- raphfrk at netscape.net a écrit :
>  I was thinking, has anyone looked at the effects of risk aversion on
> voter strategy?
>  
>  In the above example, the voter might be faced with deciding which
> strategy to use:
>  
>  C
>  31% of +2
>  69% of +1
>  
>  Expected: 1.31
>  
>  D
>  45% of -1
>  55% of +4
>  
>  Expect: 1.75
>  
>  A voter might be willing to use option C even though D gives a better
> expected value.

In my opinion, if the voter prefers to vote option C than option D,
because he doesn't want to risk the -1 outcome, then he has not 
correctly estimated that value as being -1.

I think that in a single election, with a single selection of candidates
and other voters, almost any voter should be able to assign utilities
such that Approval strategies make sense.

>  The main point is that risk aversion could be the reason that in
> practice people drift away from perfectly strategic voting.

Do feel this is a big problem? I have seen more concern that voters
will vote the opposite way: Commit to a favorite candidate and cut
off any chance of even electing the second favorite.

>  The example given was:
>  
>  Assuming that you start with $1 and can place a bet on a fair coin. If
> you win, you get 1.05 times your stake (and your stake back). You get to
> repeat the gamble as often as you want, but can only use your initial
> stake and any money you win.
>  
>  What is the optimal amount to bet in order to maximise the rate of
> income. Clearly, if you bet all your money you will with near certainty
> be bankrupt after say, 10 rounds.

I'm pretty sure you'd want to place a lot of very small bets. Do you
have the answer?

Kevin Venzke



	

	
		
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