[EM] Thompson insurance like voting for a legislature
raphfrk at netscape.net
raphfrk at netscape.net
Tue Nov 7 15:33:42 PST 2006
The legislature would be made up of
- Sitting Legislators elected by some PR system
- legislators who still have votes in their pool, but failed to get re-elected
Both sets are allowed into the legislature and may vote (speaking rights
may be different).
At the start of each month and before the first session:
- each legislator's total votes is reduced by 5% (rounded down)
- each Sitting Legislator is allocated 50 extra votes.
This gives an average of 1000 votes held per legislator and
non-sitting legislators will eventually run out of votes and
even before that their influence will diminish.
Voting occurs by
- each legislator indicates for/against and how many votes they would like to cast
One legislator is selected at random (weighted by number of votes held by
each legislator before the vote) and that legislator's vote is canceled.
Legislators may exclude themselves from this randomisation, unless they
all ask to be excluded.
Legislators are then charged using the formula:
L: Votes cast by the legislator
A: Votes cast the same way as the legislator
B: Votes cast the opposite way to the legislator
N: some parameter ... say 2
^: the power of symbol
L*(B^N)/(A^N+B^N)
Rounding occurs upwards.
The charge always works out at less or equal to what they voted.
All legislators who vote the same way pay the same fraction of
of their votes.
The legislators on the losing side are all given votes equal to the the number
they voted as compensation.
The excluded legislator gets to decide which side wins. However, he must pay
any short fall and gets any surplus.
As an example:
5 voters
A: 20 for
B: 40 for
C: 20 against
D: 60 against
E: 10 against
E is randomly selected to be excluded
Totals are:
For: 60
Against: 80
Calculating the "For" side:
fraction to be paid = (B^N)/(A^N+B^N)
(80^2)/(80^20+60^2) = 0.64
A pays 0.64*20 = 13
B pays 0.64*40 = 26
Calculating the "Against" side:
fraction to be paid = (B^N)/(A^N+B^N)
(60^2)/(80^20+60^2) = 0.36
C pays 20*0.36 = 8
D pays 80*0.36 = 29
If E chooses to block the motion, the final totals including
compensation for the losers are:
A gets 20-13 = 7
B gets 40-26 = 14
C pays = 8
D pays = 29
Total: 16 surplus
E gets the 16
If he chooses to pass the motion, the final totals including
compensation for the losers are:
A pays = 13
B pays = 26
C gets 20-8 = 12
D gets 60-29 = 31
Total: 4 deficit
E has to pay 4.
Since E was against the motion, he isn't going to pay
4 votes to pass it. The result is that the motion is
blocked.
A similar process could probably be used to vote where there
is 3 or more options.
The system means that each legislator would not care which
option E picks. If the legislator loses, the legislator receives
compensation exactly equal to the value of the vote (assuming
he was honest).
The system depends somewhat on risk aversion and no serious
agenda setting. For example, repeatedly trying to pass the
same motion would drain the opponents votes. However, that
can be combated by allowing the motion to pass and then
draining the supporters reserves by trying to repeal it.
Alternatively, a rule could be included that a bill that is
"essentially the same" cannot be voted on again until
a minimum time has passed.
The formula for the fractions can be almost anything
and doesn't have to be what I gave. It is supposed to
represent the probability that the bill will pass/fail.
Raphfrk
--------------------
Interesting site
"what if anyone could modify the laws"
www.wikocracy.com
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