[EM] Range voting, zero-info strategy simulation (Dave)

Dave Ketchum davek at clarityconnect.com
Wed Nov 1 03:14:12 PST 2006


On Tue, 31 Oct 2006 16:22:56 +0100 (CET) Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> -- Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com> a écrit :
> 
>>Quoting from below:
>> >
>> > These results suggest to me that in the zero-info case, if there are
>> > thought to be more than about 2 other voters, Range should be voted
>> > as in Approval.
>> >
>> > D. Zero-info Approval strategy. The voter gives a 10 to every
>>candidate
>> > at least as good as the average value of all candidates, and gives a
>> > 0 to the others.
>> >
>>Interpreting, I see, as a common case, a couple tolerable candidates,
>>more 
>>lemons, at least a few dozen voters - and thus every voter who is playing
>>
>>this strategy approving both tolerable candidates without indicating
>>which 
>>of them is preferred as best.
>>
>>I see such strategy as a lemon, and this research as a lemon if it 
>>promotes such strategy as it seems to.
> 
> 
> I don't understand why you say this, Dave. If for you there are a couple
> of tolerable candidates, and a bunch of bad ones, but you have no idea 
> which candidates are considered tolerable to the other voters, then it
> is indeed your best strategy to give the top score to both of the
> candidates you find tolerable. Although you may prefer to indicate a
> clear preference of one candidate over another, you must expect that
> Range will not reward you for doing so.

I do not see "for you" in the text I was responding to - and will ignore 
it in this response.

If all the voters give top score to all the tolerable candidates, then 
range will have no information to sort out which is best liked - BECAUSE 
the voters are hiding that information.

A normal election is usually not close enough to a tie for what ONE voter 
does to make a difference.  If, generally, the collection of voters that 
consider A and B tolerable vote your strategy, A and B can tie; if each 
who has a clear preference votes it, this should properly affect the result.
> 
> Kevin Venzke
-- 
  davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
            Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
                  If you want peace, work for justice.





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