[EM] using welfare functions in election methods

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 09:38 PM 5/15/2006, bql at bolson.org wrote:
>Though, the tricky thing I've always run into when trying to formulate a
>better social utility measure is that when trying to make sure no one is
>left too far behind, do we unfairly reward people who complain too much?

And if we don't, then we leave some people too far behind....

This is one of a general class of problems that I'd see Delegable 
Proxy as solving. The key is Filtering. Delegable Proxy systems that 
we are designing use the proxy as a filter. The filter judges 
traffic, and passes some but not all. It does this in both directions.

It's fairly clear that someone or some process has to filter 
information; indeed, this is the central problem of scale in 
democracy. Delegable proxy allows the individual member (citizen, 
voter, whatever) to choose the filter. Authoritarian models choose 
the filter from the top, that is, a member is, at best, assigned 
someone to go to to pass information up the structure, who may also 
be the person who transmits information down from the center or top, 
which may be, for example, orders.

The scale on which the proxies are chosen is crucial. If it is large, 
proxies concentrate too much power at one level. The only harm from 
"too small" is that the communication chain becomes long, and thus 
not so efficient.

The ideal level is one such that no proxy is overwhelmed with 
traffic, yet every member (in general) should be able to contact the 
proxy and receive personal attention.

How does it address the problem of "rewarding complaint?" In a DP 
system, a complaint does not ordinarily go directly to the top. It 
goes to a proxy, who is, most often, a low-level proxy, perhaps 
representing only, say 20 to 100 people. (The number depends on the 
nature of the organization, it could be larger, if the traffic 
permits, and it does work if it is small, just not as efficiently.) 
The proxy decides whether or not to pass the information 
("complaint") up. The proxy is in the middle, and may face pressure 
from below to pass the information on ("or else I'll give my proxy to 
someone else"), and will face pressure from above to not pass on 
frivolous information and requests ("keep sending me garbage like 
this and I'll withdraw my acceptance of your proxy.")

Crucial in the early implementations of DP is the Free Association 
context. In FAs, there is no power other than the power to 
communicate that is conferred by being at a high level, because power 
in an FA remains in the hands of the members, generally. The FA 
itself does not make controversial decisions, but individual proxies 
can advise their members in any way they choose. Presumably after 
communicating with others! The theory is that such an organization 
will naturally seek consensus, because it is empowering. Otherwise 
you end up with factions pulling against each other, with much less net result.

Yet there is no requirement that unanimity be reached. Essentially, 
the organization, in theory, will value unity and will seek it, but 
not obsessively. The DP structure actually allows individual 
attention to be given to every minority, but only relatively large 
minorities get direct consideration at the top.

If it is expected that proxies be available for communication to 
their clients, this puts pressure on the proxies to not accept too 
many clients. And especially not many clients who are complainers! 
Many people, encountering this concept for the first time, miss this. 
They assume that having more proxies gives you more power, therefore 
people will crave and seek it. Probably they will, even without 
direct power. There *will* be prestige coming with being a high-level 
proxy. But if you get there by being available to thousands of 
clients, directly, it won't be worth the work. So the way to get to a 
high level, without working yourself to death, is by becoming the 
proxy for others who themselves represent clients. And once you are 
in that position, you want your clients to do a good job of 
filtering. You don't want more than the optimum number of clients. 
The structure will regulate itself.

This is theory. We aren't going to really know until we have 
functioning DP systems. But the *theory* looks very good, from my perspective.

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