[EM] DP in a legislature

[Dave Ketchum]

My topic is a legislature, which represents all the voters in the 
district.  They appoint via proxy, rather than electing, members of the 
legislature, such as a senate.

Responding to Jobst:

Y must know if X is Y's proxy, to be able to judge whether it is time to
switch proxies.

All must know how many proxies X holds.  However this count is maintained,
how can it be managed without a record that X is Y's proxy?  Next question
is that, since there must be a record, how can it be kept secret from X?
      Perhaps doable with coding.

Others would do elections.  Seems they can get secrecy.  They also lose
ability to redo proxies until the next election.  Finally, the multilevel
proxies with opportunity for communication look good to me - but hard to
set up via election.

Seems like time for debate.

Do not understand your statement about forcing.  Partly because the record
keeping should prevent loops.
------------------------

Some thoughts on design for a senate, etc.  (here voters do proxies
instead of elections and, as I describe it, can amend their proxies 
whenever they see need):

Need to maintain a current list of voters.  New ones register; old ones
die; some move into a district; some move out.
      A district must appoint (rather than elect) multiple senators - 
likely one district to appoint the complete senate.

Any voter offering to be a proxy holder needs to offer a "platform" to
identify what kind of action they offer.
      Both lone voters, and those who already hold proxies, can offer
their collection to this holder.
      Note that there are many possible platforms - positions with few 
backers end up with no one both offering a platform AND getting enough 
proxies to get seated in the senate (access to abortion easier or harder 
and access to drugs easier or harder are reasons for 4 platforms for the 
4 basic combinations on these two issues).
      Perhaps this holder offers communication with those voters whose
proxies are held directly.  If so, there almost HAS to be a limit as to
how many voters this offer extends to - not necessarily all voters whose
proxies are held.

Secrecy of proxies:  NEEDS to be doable, yet parts of my proposal require 
openness.

The senate needs rules.  Some should be standard - likely based on
Robert's Rules.  Some need to be tailorable - some easier than others.
Basic coding I use below:
      E - easy to modify, for little problem with manipulating.
      H - hard to modify, where there can be excessive temptation to 
modify for wrong reasons.
      HH - REALLY dangerous to change.

Size of senate:
      E - to increase - when present membership sees value in letting in 
other viewpoints, and that bigger is practical.
      H - to decrease - can be temptation to lock out annoying members 
holding few proxies.

Puzzle:  Size of senate has to be kept practical.  Yet potential number of 
platforms approaches number of voters.  My best thought is that the small 
parties have to develop a platform that enough of them can share to have e 
holder of enough proxies to get on the floor of the senate.
      Size of senate has to be kept manageable.
      Do not see a voter having a voice or vote except via a holder with 
enough proxies to qualify for a seat.
           A platform with a popular combination of ideas can give its 
holder many proxies to vote.
           Owner of a platform supporting diverse ideas has to be 
considerate of the supported ideas to earn enough proxies to qualify for a 
seat.

Puzzle:  Power of individual senators has to be limited.  If one senate 
held and voted a majority of the proxies, that senator would have a 
monopoly on voting.  Make the limit a percentage of votable proxies 
votable by one senator:
      H - to make limit over 25% or under 10% (my offer).  Over 25% 
encourages concentrating voting power too close to a monopoly; under 10% 
discourages reasonable concentrations.
      E - to vary limit between those points.

Write-in votes?  I sympathize but, when I try to think farther my head 
aches.  I do say that a voter can retract his proxy, but this leaves him 
mute until s/he finds a more acceptable platform to back (this voter can 
even do a new platform, but remains mute until attracting enough proxies 
to demand a seat).

DWK

On Wed, 01 Mar 2006 07:36:24 +0100 Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Subject:  Re: [EM] proxies and confidentiality
  > Dear folks!
  >
  > A question concerning proxy voting: Does anyone know of a mechanism for
  > delegable proxy which assures that nobody knows what any other voted? In
  > particular, it seems to me that no person X must know whether or not
  > s/he is a proxy for some other person Y, and Y must not have a
  > possibility of proving to X that X is Y's proxy. Otherwise Y could force
  > X to name him as proxy! Is this possible without the use of advanced
  > technology like, say, public key cryptography?
  >
  > Yours, Jobst
  ...
-- 
    davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
    Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
              Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
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