[EM] Ruminations on strategy issues in IRV and Condorcet (was possible improved IRV method)

[raphfrk at netscape.net]

From: Simmons, Forest <simmonfo at up.edu>
> Any time that IRV does not elect the sincere CW (when there is one) 
there
> is going to be a strong incentive for order reversal under IRV, 
except under
> the (non-existent) zero information case.  [The only real life cases 
that
> exist in hot elections are the positive information and positive
> disinformation cases.]
>
> Why is there an incentive for order reversal under IRV when the CW is 
not
> elected on the basis of sincere rankings?
>
> ecause the losing faction(s) on the opposite side of the CW from the
> IRV winner would rather have the CW than the sincere IRV winner, so 
they
> have an incentive to rank the CW ahead of their favorite.
>
> On the other hand, Condorcet Compliant methods have divers ways of 
resolving
> cycles, which cycles can be created artificially by some non-CW 
faction that
> thinks it might have a chance of winning in the particular cycle 
resolution
> method that has been adopted.
                                                                         

What about a method with determines the IRV winner and the Condorcet 
winner
and then selects one of them using a random ballot.  I assume that 
someone
has already suggested it.
                                                                         

It seems to me that if you included a reasonable number of election 
methods,
then strategic voting would become considerably more difficult.  This is
esp. true if the voters must use the same ballots for all methods.  
Also,
ballots would be required to be consistant (or it collapses back to each
voter voting strategically for each individual election).
                                                                         

A ballot could be a range score ballot with an approval cutoff score.
This allowes a ranked ballot and an approval ballot to be generated.  
Also,
it ensures consistancy.  The IRV would have to handle equal rankings
though (or require that 2 candidates cannot be given the same range
score).
                                                                         

Anyway, up to 4 candidates would be considered for the random ballot 
step.
                                                                         

Another addition would be to say that any candidate who wins 3 of the 4
elections is declared the winner.  Also, any candidate may withdraw and
give their "win" to another candidate.  This adds a slight reduction in 
the
amount of randomness.
                                                                         

> Randomly chosen juries are another idea worth promoting in some 
contexts.
                                                                         

That might be a good idea for a 2nd (or 3rd) house.

(getting off topic)
                                                                         

I think a House like that could be given the responsibility for lowering
the tax rates.  This means that the if the normal Houses set the tax 
rate
to high, this one could reduce it.  However, it also means that you 
don't
end up with a system where certain groups get hit with massive tax 
rates.
This splits the tax system into 4 parts
                                                                         

Setting up the tax system (current 2 houses)
Reducing any unjust taxes (new house)
Deciding what the taxes should be spent on (current 2 houses)
Spending the taxes. (Executive)

This adds division of power to the tax system.  In fact, a better
system may be to have the new house decide how much total taxes
should be collected.  The other houses would then decide how to
split the taxes between projects.