[EM] possible improved IRV method

Eric Gorr eric at ericgorr.net
Wed Jun 28 19:07:56 PDT 2006

Allen Pulsifer wrote:
> Getting back to Condorcet, there is a majority in each pair-wise comparison,
> but for each pair, it is a different set of voters.  There is no way, at the
> end of the election, to go back and say "This is the majority that elected
> the winner".
> In certain cases, Condorcet can also result in a strange outcomes.  Take for
> example, the following (admittedly contrived) situation:
> 166:A>B>D>C
> 166:A>C>D>B
>  83:A>D>B>C
>  83:A>D>C>B
>  83:B>C>D>A
>  83:B>D>A>C
>  83:B>D>C>A
>  83:C>B>D>A
>  83:C>D>A>B
>  83:C>D>B>A
>   2:D>A>C>B
>   1:A>B>C>D
> The total votes is 999.  Candidate A, with 499 top rankings, is only 1 vote
> shy of a majority.  His two second rankings would bring him across the
> threshold.  Nonetheless, Candidate D, with 2 first preferences and 498
> second preferences is the Condorcet winner.  Doesn't that seem backwards?


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