[EM] possible improved IRV method

eric at ericgorr.net eric at ericgorr.net
Wed Jun 28 15:12:51 PDT 2006

Quoting Jonathan Lundell <jlundell at pobox.com>:

> IRV's problem with ignoring later preferences and not always finding
> a Condorcet winner is a direct consequence of the way it avoids
> Condorcet's problem with encouraging insincere voting.

On what basis do you claim that a good Condorcet Method would  
encourage insincere voting?

I have yet to see any convincing arguments that it does. Most of the  
attempts tend to center around a single group of voters attempting to  
manipulate the election to their advantage. The fundamental flaws with  
these particular arguments is that they assume that (a) no other  
groups will attempt counter-strategies, (b) that a single group of  
voters will even be capable of obtaining an accurate enough picture to  
figure out how to change their votes - accuracy they would need  
appears to be far greater then one is able to obtain with a scientific  
survey of voter opinion and (c) the fact that if multiple groups of  
voters are involved in insincere voting when a Condorcet Method is  
used that the ultimate resolution becomes quite chaotic and the worst  
possible winner may be selected. It is the potential for selected the  
least favorite choice that causes me to believe that a good Condorcet  
Method actually encourages sincere voting.

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