[EM] A modified Random Ballot that supports compromising

Simmons, Forest simmonfo at up.edu
Tue Jun 27 17:28:08 PDT 2006

Great Idea!
It reminds me of Martin Harper's idea for recasting Approval  as a vote concentration method in order to appease the extreme "one person one vote" people.
Martin suggested listing all of the candidates in order of approval count, and then on each ballot circle the candidate approved on that ballot that is highest on the list.  Each ballot has one candidate circled, so each voter ends up supporting exactly one candidate.
 Do a plurality count of circled candidates.  It's not hard to show that the Plurality winner is always the highest candidate on the list, i.e. the Approval winner.
Your method is an improvement in some ways, but how to eliminate dangerous candidates w/o destroying the nice properties???
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