[EM] Yet Another Lottery Method
raphfrk at netscape.net
raphfrk at netscape.net
Sat Jun 24 08:33:52 PDT 2006
From: Simmons, Forest <simmonfo at up.edu>
> This method makes use of ordinal information as well as approval
So each voter would rank the candidates and also select one candidate
the threshold between approved and unapproved ? All unranked candidates
>1. Eliminate each candidate X for which there is a candidate Y such
>each of more than half of the ballots Y is approved and X is not.
What about going direct to Condorcet here ? Eliminate any candidate
not in the Smith (or Schwartz) set and then use random ballot.
I guess the problem being that voters who are going to lose might be
to force a tie which gives them a chance of getting their candidate
even though it also gives a lower preference a chance of being elected.
not sure your method is immune from this.
>2. Use random ballot among the remaining candidates to choose the
>Note that if any candidate X is eliminated, then some candidate Y must
>than fifty percent approval, which makes her invulnerable to
>This method satisfies Monotonicity, Clone Independence, Independence
>Dominated Alternatives, Strong Favorite Betrayal Criterion, etc. In
>near as I can tell there is no incentive for any insincere order
>Of course, Random Ballot without step 1 satisfies all of those
>but it is a bit too promiscuous with the probability.
Assuming the votes are:
45: A, B approved ( B>A>>C )
40: C approved ( C>>A>B )
The remaining 15 voters are of the opinion
if they approve A only:
C is eliminated ( 45+15 = 60 votes approve A and not C )
A: 40+15 = 55%
B: 45 = 45%
C: elim = 0%
OTOH, if they approve C (tactical voting)
A,B are eliminated ( 55% approve C and none other)
A: elim= 0%
B: elim= 0%
C: 100% ( only remaining )
It is not clear to me that a 55% chance of your favorite and 45% chance
of your lowest choice is superior to a 100% chance of your middle
This means that depending on the 15 voters relative preference
it might be in their interests to tactical vote and just approve C,
they prefer A to C.
If the ranked choice must be consistant with the approval choice, they
just vote C approved and C first choice as a pure tactical vote.
>With this new method any united majority can eliminate any dangerous
>from consideration. This majority defense feature has a name, but I
>to remember what it is.
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