[EM] multi-method combo

[Dave Ketchum]

I choke on your collection of methods:

Imposing both range and ranked choice demands that the voter consider both 
methods.  It also complicates the ballot and the counting.

No point to having both IRV and Condorcet:
      Usually they will select the same winner.
      When IRV fails it will offer an invalid winner - the reason for 
rejecting IRV.
      When there are near ties, they can differ in deciding which leading 
candidate should win - so who cares.

If I understand complaints about troublemaking, Tom and his friends, 
SOMEHOW knowing how all others will vote, vote a pattern that will change 
the winner, without directly voting their desire.
      How do they manage this without Dick ad HIS friends finding out and 
doing a counter plot.
      ANYWAY, how did these troublemakers get a valid picture as to what 
all other voters were doing? "what they think other voters are going to 
do" is not sufficient for successful troublemaking.

DWK

On Wed, 07 Jun 2006 15:17:51 -0700 Monkey Puzzle wrote:

> Hey there, you all.  I've been off the list for a while.
> 
> Recently I read The Wisdom of Crowds (
> 
>          http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Wisdom_of_Crowds 
> 
> ), and one thing that struck me is how important it is that when
> aggregating the opinions of a group, it is crucial that each vote be
> independent.  Each voter should express his/her preference without
> considering what other voters or blocks are going to do, as much as
> possible.
> 
> Unfortunately, given Arrow's theorem, there is going to be something
> unsatisfactory about any election methods proposal, and in every
> proposed method on this list, there is some situation in which a
> faction could successfully game the system based on what they think
> other voters are going to do.
> 
> If the object is to discourage strategic voting and encourage
> complete preferences, it seems like you want characteristics like
> 
>     Later no harm
> 
>     FBC
> 
>     Later no help
> 
> in addition to the usual criteria we desire in a "strong"
> Condorcet-completion scheme, to discourage bullet voting.  But you
> want all the other strong Condorcet properties, because you want to
> avoid pushover voting, like you get with IRV.
> 
> So I've been thinking about combining several methods.  No method
> would have all the desirable characteristics, but in combination there
> would be a partial satisfying of most criteria.  Use a simple ballot
> that can be interpreted many ways, tabulate the winner using several
> methods, and then choose randomly from among those winners, weighted
> by the number of methods that pick that winner.  Here's an example:
> 
>     - Ratings ballot,
>       0 (least preferred) to 100 (most preferred),
>       equal ratings allowed
> 
>     - Use M methods simultaneously.  For example, M=3:
>     
>       1) Range Voting / Cardinal Ratings
> 
>       2) IRV [ER(whole) variation]
> 
>       3) Schulze(wv)
> 
>     - Calculate the 3 different winners.
> 
>     - Pick 1, 2 or 3 with uniformly random probability, and the
>       overall winner is the winner of the corresponding tabulation
>       method.
> 
> This incurs extra cost for multiple tabulations, with IRV-ER(whole)
> being the most expensive, but the advantage is that any strategy that
> would increase the odds of winning under one method would have only a
> 1/3 chance of succeeding.
> 
> So some questions for you all:
> 
> Is this idea completely off the wall, or does it look like it might
> have some merit?
> 
> If it has some merit, what would be a good combination of methods?
> 
> MP

-- 
  davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
            Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
                  If you want peace, work for justice.