[EM] Clone proofing Copeland

Simmons, Forest simmonfo at up.edu
Sat Dec 30 17:52:14 PST 2006

Here's a version that is both clone proof and monotonic:
The winner is the alternative A with the smallest number of ballots on which alternatives that beat A pairwise are ranked in first place. [shared first place slots are counted fractionally]
That's it.
This method satisfies the Smith Criterion, Monotonicity, and Clone Independence.
I'll leave it up to Chris to tell us which of Woodall's criteria are not respected by this method.
I also like the stochastic version that chooses by random ballot from the set of alternatives  S, such that for each  A in S,  at most fifty percent of the first place slots are taken up by alternatives that beat A pairwise.
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