[EM] Comments on the Yee/Bolson/et.al. pictures

[raphfrk at netscape.net]

  From: wds at math.temple.edu
 > 3. Random tie-breaking is essential so all candiate winnign chances are always
 > 100% independent of the candidate-ordering.
 
 Definately.
 
 > 4. I find Venzke's discovery with a 10-candidate set that "IRV tends to favor
 > outsiders"
 > whereas "Approval(mean-based cutoff) tends to favor centrists" very interesting.
 > But it needs more investigation with
 
 This sorta makes sense as centre squeeze is a known issue of IRV
 
 > 5. Approval(mean based cutoff) looks pretty bad in these sims, although so far
 > the
 > sims have not employed correct random tiebreaking so I don't know how much of
 > them to believe. But anyway, it would be interesting when that issue is
 > repaired. This seems to be the possible basis for a good attack against
 > Approval Voting.
 
 The new results (on Brian Olson's site) do in fact have the random tie
 break rule.
 
 I think a zero info strategy is always going to have problems for approval.
 
 >
 > 6. However, I have proved the following theorems in the large#voters limit:
 > (a) approval with randomized-oblivious thresholds chosen by voters yields
 > Voronoi diagram.
 > (b) approval with the following kind of strategic voters, also yield Voronoi
 > diagrams:
 > 1. run approval election. (Say X wins.)
 > 2. cast votes using X's utility as cutoff where
 > Y>X ==> approve Y.
 > Y<X ==> disapprove Y.
 > Y=X ==> toss a fair coin to decide to approve or disapprove Y.
 > 3. go back to (1) until stabilizes on a single winner who keeps winning.
 > which two theorems, I suppose, form some sort of defense for approval voting.
 
 This means that the winner of the previous election has a 50% chance of being
 approved by each voter, so only the condorcet winner can be stable ?
 
 >
 > 7. Why the heck are you simulators not trying RANGE VOTING? (With voters
 > who "normalize" their range scores x via x --> (x-worstScore)/(bestScore-worstScore)
 > so that the best candidate gets range vote 1, the worst 0, and the rest are
 > reals
 > somewhere in between? [Bolson actually had "range voting" = "social utility
 > winner"
 > computing twice the same thing with different names, which was both false and
 > silly.]
 
 Yeah, I said the same thing.
 
 The source is available to add new methods.
 
    Raphfrk
 --------------------
 Interesting site
 "what if anyone could modify the laws"
 
 www.wikocracy.com   
 
  
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