[EM] Forest Simmons new cloneproof simple Condorcet method

[Warren Smith]

>Forest Simmons:
Here's a version that is both clone proof and monotonic:

The winner is the alternative A with the smallest number of ballots on which alternatives that beat A
pairwise are ranked in first place. [shared first place slots are counted fractionally]

That's it.

This method satisfies the Smith Criterion, Monotonicity, and Clone Independence.

--WDS:
this is an elegant method!
Note that it is IMMUNE to my "DH3 pathology!"
http://rangevoting.org/DH3.html
It is strategically pointless to "bury" (lower artificially) a rival
to your favorite below some non-entities, because if those nonentitites are never
ranked top, doing so makes no difference.

And it satisfies mono-add-plump and mono-append (two Woodall criteria)!

And it is simple!