[EM] FAVS

[Warren Smith]

Chris Benham asked what is good about satisfying FAVS.

Perhaps Scott Ritchie (FAVS inventor) can say.

Parties trying to create "how to vote" advice cards would appreciate FAVS.
But so what.

Range Voting was recently derided (in THE NATION magazine, Dec 25, page 22)
as "a strategic mess."
What does that mean (I wonder)?  Anyhow, the fact that range satisfies FAVS
whereas other systems do not, seems to me to make it LESS of a strategic "mess,"
not more, than other systems.   And in general Range Voting has sipler
strtagey than almost any other system, plus provably nice
properties under strategic voting (e.g. http://rangevoting.org/PleasantSurprise.html
http://rangevoting.org/AppCW.html ) - theorems that no other voting method currently
can match.  So THE NATION seems  definitely wrong.  However, again, so what?  Maybe being
a strategic mess is a superior way to be.   I don't really know, myself.
I'm just interested in FAVS as a matter of curiosity.  It is an interesting
property for a voting system to have (or not).

I think the main open question about FAVS is this:
are there Condorcet methods which obey FAVS (in complete-info scenarios -
they are known all to disobey IFAVS)?

Warren D Smith
http://rangevoting.org