[EM] simpler proof of "no conflict theorem" now trivial

[Dave Ketchum]

What are you trying to say???

Your lonely sentence is true, but I do not see why you say it.

DWK

Paul Kislanko wrote:
> Sentences should have subjects and predicates.
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: election-methods-bounces at electorama.com
> [mailto:election-methods-bounces at electorama.com] On Behalf Of Dave Ketchum
> Sent: Sunday, August 20, 2006 9:08 PM
> To: Jonathan Lundell
> Cc: election-methods at electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] simpler proof of "no conflict theorem" now trivial
> 
> Maybe time to start over, unless someone can find something decent written 
> down!
> 
> We are talking of ranked choice, such as IRV does.
> 
> Normally possible to rank every candidate.  Restrictions tolerable, but 
> MUST be able to rank at least best and second.
> 
> Equal ranks permitted, when the voter sees a tie in value.
> 
> Cycles must be expected and attended to.  Here there are various ways of 
> attending to choose from.
> 
> BTW - I choke on the word "sincere" - I keep my work tolerable by 
> accepting a ballot as being what the voter meant!  Anyway, rare for a 
> voter to know enough about what other voters - guessing what this voter 
> might do - do in response.
> 
> DWK
> 
> On Sun, 20 Aug 2006 13:35:14 -0700 Jonathan Lundell wrote:
> 
>>At 4:58 PM -0700 8/16/06, David Cary wrote:
>>
>>
>>>Without knowing the exact wording of the criterion, it can be very
>>>difficult to judge whether or not an election method meets the
>>>criterion, or whether the criterion makes sense or contains
>>>ambiguities. 
>>>
>>>As stated on Wikipedia (
>>>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_criterion ), there is
>>>certainly some ambiguity, as mentioned on the discussion page:
>>>
>>>"The Condorcet criterion for a voting system is that it chooses the
>>>Condorcet winner when one exists."
>>>
>>>"The Condorcet candidate or Condorcet winner of an election is the
>>>candidate who, when compared in turn with each of the other
>>>candidates, is preferred over the other candidate."
>>>
>>>The ambiguity is about exactly how candidates are compared with each
>>>other and what preferences are to be used.  The balloted preferences
>>>of the voting system in question? The sincere preferences of the
>>>voters? Is there a hidden presumption that voters cast ballots that
>>>are sincere, or are at least consistent with their sincere
>>>preferences?  Is the Condorcet criterion only applicable to certain
>>>kinds of election methods?
>>
>>
>>Good point. The previously cited paper "In Praise of Manipulation" is 
>>problematical in this regard, in that the authors get way too literal 
>>about the meaning of "sincere".
>>
>>I take the meaning of "preferred" above to equivalent to asking the 
>>voter in question to break a tie between the two candidates. If your 
>>vote will swing the outcome, which of these two candidates would you 
>>choose for the seat to be filled?
>>
>>The problem is, of course, that this is seldom if ever the context in 
>>which the voter actually marks a ballot, often for strategic reasons 
>>(fear of wasting a vote, wanting to bury a close competitor, etc).
>>
>>Hence the desirability of an election method that encourages a 
>>rational voter to cast a sincere ballot.
>>
>>
>>
>>>The more these ambiguities are resolved to make the Condorcet winner
>>>dependent on the election method under consideration, the easier it
>>>may be for an election method to satisfy the Condorcet criterion.
>>>
>>>The Wikipedia article is notably lacking any references.
>>
>>
>>Many of the election-methods Wikipedia articles leave a lot to be 
>>desired (the Droop quota article is a good (bad) example).
> 


-- 
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  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
            Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
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