[EM] Voting by selecting a published ordering (was sidetracked to EC)
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
abd at lomaxdesign.com
Sat Apr 29 15:57:43 PDT 2006
At 03:03 PM 4/29/2006, Steve Eppley wrote:
>My question was more specifically whether there would be sufficiently strong
>incentives for Gore to choose to rank McCain over Bush, even though
>McCain is not a member
>of Gore's party. If candidates will behave that way, then this
>simple voting method is
>quite worthy of promotion.
As the plurality winner, Gore might have some incentive to truncate
his ballot. However, Published Ordering is likely -- if the rules
permit, and they should -- to attract many more candidates. For
example, add another candidate to the mix who ranks Himself, Gore,
McCain, Bush. If Gore just ranks himself, this additional candidate
might take away some of his vote.
Published Ordering could radically change the electoral landscape....
>less important elections must come first, to demonstrate to the
>public the desirability of
>the new method(s). (This is another reason why I consider our recent
>discussion of the
>Electoral College to have gotten us temporarily off track.)
I agree, about the desirability of implementing reforms in smaller
elections. Not to mention that it is probably easier to accomplish!
However, if we are talking about a Presidential election, it is
entirely possible for a single state to reform its system of choosing
electors, and far better, and more practical, reforms are available
than simple proportional assignment, which is essentially suicide if
implemented in a single state. There are reforms that could come
state-by-state and result in overall reform. And they are not
impossible. Note that there is such a reform movement which was
endorsed in a recent New York Times editorial, and which has
significant support from major politicians.....
> I'm wondering now if it would
>have been more helpful if I'd chosen an example without recognizable
>names, such as the
No. The example given was quite good, and examples with R1, R2 and D
are far less eloquent.... But, using that:
> Three candidates R1, R2 and D competing for a seat in
> some state's Senate or Assembly.
>[D is the Plurality winner apparent, R2 the Condorcet winner
>apparent, from polls]
>Will D publish the ordering D > R2 > R1?
As I've stated before, I'd prefer Asset Voting, where D doesn't have
to disclose his vote reassignments in advance, but can negotiate them
after the election. I'd presume that if D, failing to gain a majority
as required, refused to reassign votes to the obvious compromise
winner, the Condorcet winner R2, he'd be committing political
suicide. But more to the point, I'd expect a fairly large number of
minor candidates to collectively hold the balance. Wouldn't it be
interesting if the public could negotiate, from a position of
strength, with politicians? That what deliberative methods such as
Asset Voting would make possible, the public being represented by the
collection of candidates holding reassignable votes.
But before testing these methods in public elections, even in small
ones, I'm suggesting using reformed political structures in NGOs, and
especially in reform organizations. I find it quite interesting that
the norm, almost universal, is that organizations dedicating to
reforming democracy avoid democracy as if it were the plague.
I think there are a number of reasons for this, one of them being
that those who found these organizations think of "democracy" in
terms of flawed structures and systems that are, indeed, quirky and
inefficient.... so these reformers opt for oligarchical structures
that leave them in control. My opinion, though, is that democracy,
properly implemented, is by far superior. But the devil is in the details....
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