[EM] Voting by selecting a published ordering
davek at clarityconnect.com
Mon Apr 3 21:00:04 PDT 2006
On Mon, 03 Apr 2006 20:44:45 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 08:16 PM 4/3/2006, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>> Looking much like Condorcet. From there we know that cycles can occur,
>> needing more thought here.
I see nothing prohibiting the following collection of lists:
These happen in Condorcet, and give us headaches as to procedure. I see
nothing here justifying claims as to simplicity in counting.
> The proposal was one which uses any method allowing a ranked ballot. The
> difference between it an standard plurality -- it uses the standard
> plurality ballot -- is that instead of voting for a candidate, strictly,
> one is voting for a list provided by a candidate.
> While it is theoretically possible for that list to not be headed by the
> candidate, we may presume that it is. I.e., we may presume that any
> candidate will put his or her own name at the top of the list.
> It is also possible to do this without using candidate-provided lists,
> in which case it is essentially Asset Voting. But the idea here is that
> candidates have provided a list, which is published, so when voters vote
> for a candidate, they know where their vote goes if that candidate is
> It seems to have been missed by Mr. Ketchum that the voting is for a
> candidate, and that each candidate provides only one list, in advance of
> the election. Hence he asked:
There was NOTHING in the original post restricting a candidate to a single
list. A candidate can certainly know that backers disagree as to second
or lower choice.
>> Starts out looking good but, how many lists might there be with half a
>> dozen candidates?
> Half a dozen.
>> What would this quantity do to the voting machine?
>> How much might this confuse the voter looking for an acceptable
> Not at all. I suppose I might, as a voter, be mildly interested in what
> my favorite candidate would do with my vote, but, for me, the issue is
> this: if I consider someone trustworthy enough to serve in an office,
> why not consider them trustworthy to vote for someone who is also
> relatively worthy of election.
At this point it matters VERY LITTLE as to what you or I might do. What
matters is what a collection of voters might desire - that could be useful.
Especially for minor candidates that expect to lose, their backers very
likely disagree as to second choices.
> This is an extremely simple ballot and process. The method by which the
> lists are used would be any ranked ballot method, as if the voters had
> marked the ballot with one of the provided lists. I understand that in
> STV elections, parties often provide such lists anyway, and very many
> voters, out of party loyalty, use them.
> This method is quite clearly superior to standard plurality and, in my
> view, to IRV. It allows experts to make ranking decisions, with the
> public choosing their favorite *expert*. (Candidates frequently know
> other candidates, far better than does the public.)
>> > This is exactly the kind of simplicity that we need to get a viable
>> improvement over plurality for public elections.
> I agree that it is totally simple. Any complexity would be the
> complexity of the exact election method chosen. However, reporting and
> counting the vote would be much simpler, because the vote can be
> reported just the same as plurality. It is only in the analysis that the
> difference comes. And anyone can do that calculation, using the provided
>> Sounds like as much trouble as Condorcet and in counting complexity,
>> though doable with present voting machines - provided they can tolerable
>> the number of choices.
> Of course, the method was misunderstood. The number of choices is the
> number of candidates, same as in plurality, and the counting complexity
> is actually low, since precincts can simply report the standard vote
> counts, they do not have to analyze. Analysis will be no more complex
> than required by the ranked election method used, and should be easier
> because of the limited number of ballot types involved.
> This is a case where overvoting could create problems; however, there
> might be a way to analyze overvotes that would work. But I won't get
> into that here, I'm just noting that there is, with this proposal, on
> the face, a reason to discard overvotes that is rational, unlike the
> case with discarding them under standard plurality. Overvotes here,
> unlike the case with standard plurality, would create counting
> complexity even if a way is determined to use them. I'd agree with
> keeping it simple.
davek at clarityconnect.com people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
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