[EM] IRV done right... satisfies Strong FBC?
stepjak at yahoo.fr
Tue Apr 4 08:09:48 PDT 2006
Just passing through.
--- Antonio Oneala <watermark0n at yahoo.com> a écrit :
> This method seems to satisfy the Strong FBC, because your vote will not
> go to the second choice unless your candidate has absolutely no chance of
To satisfy strong FBC, it would have to be the case that by changing your
you could not move the win from C to B, for example.
> It also passes the participation criterion,
I have to disagree with this. Your showing up to vote can affect the
winners in an arbitrary way.
> It would satisfy the
> criterion if you didn't allow people to rank as many people 1st place as
> they wanted, but I really don't see how limiting voter choice is going to
> improve the method too much.
You don't have to do that. Majority criterion usually refers to a
strict first preference.
> From what I can tell from it, it ALMOST
> satisfies Arrow's Impossibility theorom, except that it is not fully
> deterministic because it makes a lot of assumptions about voter strategy.
I don't understand this. How do you satisfy Arrow's impossibility theorem?
This method is more like Bucklin than IRV. ER-Bucklin(whole) satisfies
weak FBC. I don't know of a deterministic method that satisfies strong FBC.
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