[EM] IRV done right... satisfies Strong FBC?

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Tue Apr 4 08:09:48 PDT 2006


Just passing through.

--- Antonio Oneala <watermark0n at yahoo.com> a écrit :
> This method seems to satisfy the Strong FBC, because your vote will not
> go to the second choice unless your candidate has absolutely no chance of
> winning.

To satisfy strong FBC, it would have to be the case that by changing your
vote from




you could not move the win from C to B, for example.

> It also passes the participation criterion, 

I have to disagree with this. Your showing up to vote can affect the
winners in an arbitrary way.

> It would satisfy the 
>  majority
>  criterion if you didn't allow people to rank as many people 1st place as
> they wanted, but I really don't see how limiting voter choice is going to
> improve the method too much.

You don't have to do that. Majority criterion usually refers to a
strict first preference.

>  From what I can tell from it, it ALMOST
> satisfies Arrow's Impossibility theorom, except that it is not fully
> deterministic because it makes a lot of assumptions about voter strategy.

I don't understand this. How do you satisfy Arrow's impossibility theorem?

This method is more like Bucklin than IRV. ER-Bucklin(whole) satisfies
weak FBC. I don't know of a deterministic method that satisfies strong FBC.

Kevin Venzke


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