[EM] Approval versus Ranked methods

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Forest,

--- "Simmons, Forest " <simmonfo at up.edu> a écrit :
> That said, an even simpler method comes closer to satisfying the Strong FBC than any of these
> other more complicated methods:  Asset Voting:
>  
> Voters vote for their favorite, who represents them by proxy in an election completion
> convention.  Write-ins are allowed.  In the completion convention the proxies (i.e. the
> candidates including write-ins) get as many votes (their "assets") as they were granted by the
> voters.  In other words, whatever ballots they cast in the election completion method (some
> reliable method like Approval, DMC, or Shulze) are given weights equal to their "assets."

I don't share the view that this is closer to satisfying strong FBC. You have
no confidence that your candidate will be able to (or willing to) help cement
the best result you could have gotten. There is little reason to believe that
your favorite candidate can pick a compromise better than you can.

It's not even guaranteed that at least one candidate shares your preference order.

Kevin Venzke



	

	
		
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