[EM] Voting as duty (was ties & truncation)
davek at clarityconnect.com
Thu Sep 15 21:27:07 PDT 2005
Puzzling where this comes from.
If the voters are to vote, they still need to decide who to vote for.
These committees look like a lot of work - remember that there are many
elections on a normal election day - some perhaps with districts as small
as one precinct.
Cure for this nonsense is for most of the committee members to flip a
coin, or equivalent, before voting.
On Thu, 15 Sep 2005 09:24:30 -0400 Abd ulRahman Lomax wrote:
> At 05:17 PM 9/14/2005, Simmons, Forest wrote:
>> (1) Pick 400 registered voters at random. Give them time off work,
>> and have them study the candidates carefully and decide a tentative
>> winner by some reputable method (like DMC, Shulze, Approval, Asset
>> Voting, etc.) It will definitely be worth the time for these voters,
>> since there will be an appreciable chance that their votes will be
>> (2) Analyze the ballots from step 1 statistically. If the results are
>> so decisive that there is less than a one percent chance that a
>> different winner would emerge from the same method involving the
>> entire electorate, then submit the tentative winner to the electorate
>> for ratification by a Yes/No vote. [and more]
> The idea of using a committee, essentially, to select a tentative winner
> is an excellent one, and parallels my own ideas in a way. If the
> committee is statistically unbiased, it should work. Tricky to ensure
> that, however.
> It would be a good idea to have *any* election result that is below a
> clear and general consensus (supermajority definition not stated here)
> be submitted to a ratification vote. This effectively forces voters to
> approve or disapprove of the result. Thus, in the end, it is Approval
> which has been used, in a way, with a very significant tweak that deals
> with straight-ticket, truncated votes.
> However, it might be advisable to allow more than one candidate on the
> runoff ballot. Top two (by undefined standards; what about Condorcet and
> Approval winners?) might be appropriate. More than that, we would start
> to get strategic voting in the runoff. Another option in the runoff
> might be () Start Over.
> If a majority of the voters want to redo the whole election process, it
> should be their privilege. Presumably the existing office-holders would
> remain pending new results, or there could be statutory caretakers.
> However, in my own concepts, instead of some abstract (or possibly
> corrupt) agency choosing voters at random, *the voters* choose
> representatives on the committee, through Delegable Proxy. The committee
> functions deliberatively, instead of aggregatively. The committee could
> be quite a bit smaller. And the result would *still* be subjected to a
> full vote by the general electorate. (Committee members would have
> variable voting power according to the votes they received.
> Alternatively, Asset Voting would be used to create a PR Committee that
> is almost fully representative, while being a peer committee, though
> this introduces constraints that produce the "almost."
> In a DP committee, one member might represent a very large percentage of
> the electorate. If the committee size is fixed, this allows members to
> be elected to the committee who represent much smaller blocks of voters.
> This is why DP is more fully representative than Asset. However, there
> could be advantages to peer committees, in terms of the encouragement of
> In the end, the voters should choose their own election methods. And,
> again, DP is a way to do it that would be likely to produce an
> intelligent result, enjoying the broadest possible consensus.
davek at clarityconnect.com people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
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