[EM] Re: Condorcet's strategy problem
ahtarr at gmail.com
Tue Sep 13 21:51:47 PDT 2005
election-methods at electorama.com
On 9/13/05, MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com> wrote:
> I'll start looking for a BeatpathWinner FBC failure example, but I hope
> others will too, because it isn't so easy to find one.
There was an FBC failure example posted recently. It arises from a cycle
with a lot of sincere indifference. It goes like this:
68% C > 32% A
63% A > 37% B
41% B > 31% C
Consider the 32% A>B>C faction. It takes 12% (38% of the faction) of them to
win the election for B by "strong" favorite betrayal (B>A>C), making B the
Condorcet winner. They can win the election for B by "weak" favorite
betrayal (A=B>C) if 22% (69% of the faction) vote that way, but they have
incentive for reversal unless they know for sure that that many will act in
a similar fashion.
In my opinion, a method where favorite betrayal scenarios are restricted to
a very narrow range of situations are not a major problem. If the polls
start to look something like this, voters will know well in advance. In the
vast majority of situations, there is no incentive to bury your favorite.
Forest has argued recently (with regards to DMC, but the argument still
applies here) that voters will be very reluctant to vote full favorite
betrayal unless they know for certain that it is necessary. This runs
contrary to what Mike suggest, which is that voters will reverse order
unless they are absolutely sure it is *not* necessary. Ultimately it is very
hard for any of us to predict what effect wv Condorcet voting would have on
the political climate and people's attitudes toward voting.
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