[EM] Re: approval strategy in DMC
araucaria.araucana at gmail.com
Tue Sep 13 09:05:31 PDT 2005
Simmons, Forest <simmonfo <at> up.edu> writes:
> Jeff Fisher recently opined that DMC voters would
> likely adopt the strategy of approving all candidates that they considered
> certain to be beaten pairwise by their Favorite. This
> would put these candidates in a better position to doubly defeat the
> candidates that might otherwise beat X.
> But this strategy would also increase the chances of
> doubly defeating their compromise Y.
> The only time this strategy would be safe is
> when favorite X is so strong that compromise Y is not needed.
> In that case, X probably doesn't need the over-kill,
> but deserves to be the winner unless the other factions are united enough to
> combine against X.
In connection with this, I've made a slight change on the DMC page on electowiki.
I've extended the definition somewhat: the ballot is a combination of ordinal
ranking (equal ranks allowed) and approval rating. The approval rating
information can be either binary approval (approved/not-approved) or
finer-grained cardinal ratings ([1,0,-1] or [100,99,...,1,0]). I think this is
more of a difference in implementation than the method, since the initial
ordering is by total approval.
In the above case, a more graduated cardinal rating (say 100-0) would allow a
voter to approve weaker candidates with a low, but non-zero, rating.
Using the ordinal/ratings method I posted a few days ago, the ballot would not
be substantially more complicated than a plain approval-cutoff ballot.
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